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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Paul R. Baier* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"The great ideals of liberty and equality," Cardozo tells us, 
are preserved against the assaults of  opportunism, the expediency of 
the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, the scorn and 
derision of those who have no patience with general principles, by 
enshrining them in constitutions, and consecrating to the task of 
their protection a body of def enders. 1 
Let me begin by praising lawyers-"those who must run the race 
and keep the faith. "2 Each term brings many defenders to the bar 
of the Fifth Circuit, a court whose annual canvassing of the ideals 
of liberty and equality has made it noble. The lawyer who won Joe 
Hogan's case in the Fifth Circuit last term,3 and who later sealed 
his victory in the Supreme Court;' deserves the congratulations of 
our profession. What a burden to sit in judgment. What a joy to 
share in the process. "No higher duty, no more solemn responsibil­
ity," Hugo Black wrote in his inspiring way, rests upon court and 
counsel "than that of translating into living law and maintaining 
this constitutional shield deliberately planned and inscribed for 
the benefit of every human being subject to our Constitution-of 
whatever race, creed or persuasion."11 Loyola Law Review dedi­
cated its first Fifth Circuit survey to Mr. Justice Black, who cared 
for "lawyers in the great tradition" as much as he cared for the 
• Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. 
Member of the Louisiana Bar and the Bar of the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Ap­
peals. Editor, HUGO BLACK: THE MAGNIFICENT REBEL, A PERSONAL MEMOIR, by Hugo Lafay­
ette Black and Elizabeth Seay Black, forthcoming. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the able counsel and good company of Mr. James 
Viator, quondam Lecturer in Constitutional History at the Claremont Colleges, particularly 
with respect to unraveling the mysteries of the federal Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. 
1. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE or THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 92-93 (1921). 
2. Id. at 93. 
3. Hogan v. Mississippi University for Women, 646 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1981). 
4. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
5. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940). 
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first amendment. 8 Civil liberties are, of course, the ultimate re­
sponsibility of courts. But it is to lawyers that we look for their 
protection in the first instance. 
During the term just ended, I was privileged to play the law­
yer's part in two cases of grave moment. Certiorari is pending in 
one, hence a strict sense of propriety forbids my commenting on a 
case referred to in the briefs as Forest Hill II. What is at issue is 
the scope of equitable remedial discretion in school desegregation 
cases. Whether the chancellor may close two rural communities' 
only schools, one predominantly black, one predominantly white, 
and mix their student bodies, kindergarteners included, at a mid­
point ten miles from home is a troubling question. It split the 
panel, two-to-one. A previous panel had reversed and remanded 
unanimously. More than that I will not say here, other than to di­
rect the reader to the opinion in Valley v. Rapides Parish School 
Board. 7 Those philosophically minded might want to have a look 
at it. 
The other case is final, and an equally strict sense of fealty to 
the Fifth Circuit and to the first amendment moves me to discuss 
it here. I know In re Baier8 better than I know other cases whose 
6. The expression "lawyers in the great tradition" is how Justice Black described law-
yera who have greatly honored the profession of the law: 
{men] like Lord Erakine, �ames Otis, Clarence Darrow, a n d  the multitude of others 
who have dared to speak m defense of causes and clients without regard to personal 
?a.ni:er to themselves. 
The !�gal pr�fession will lose much of its nobility and its glory 
1f 1 t  1s not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. T o  force the Ber to become 
a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving government f, · • d " ·d 1 · t 
. . 
. 
• • 
earmg m 1v1 ua s 1s o 
hum1hate and degrade 1t .. . .  We must not be afraid to be free. 
In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 115-16 (1961) (Black J di"sse t" ) . . , ., n 1ng . _7. Valley v. Rapides P�1sh School �d. [Rapides //], 702 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 104 S. Ct. 276 (1983), Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd IR 'd I] F d 925 
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 276 (1983). 
· api es • 646 ·2 
Of course, there were other desegregation opinions d · h · 
I d d S h 1 D. 
urmg t e term viz· Ross v Hous-
ton n epen ent c oo 1st., 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983) ( 
' · · ed 
of every residue of official discrimination, post-desegregat· d 
once sch�! system purg 
bar judicial recognition that the school system is unitar . 
·
�
n 
h 
emogra�h1c changes do not 
effective action have no affirmative fourteenth-amendm
:�t 
�c ool officials who have 1'.1ken 
actions of those who vote with their feet")· p · D . 
uty to respond to the private 
• 
rice v. emson Ind d s h · 694 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding erroneous d" t · 
epen ent c ool Dist., 
1s rict court's method f d . . h 
current racially indentifiable schools are unconstituti"o 1 . 
0 etermmmg whet er 
. . . na vestiges of de · t" · the question 1s essentially one of factual inference and cannot b . 
JUre segrega 10n, 
of law); United States v. State of Texas, 680 F.2d 356 (fith 
��etermmed purely as a matter 
or 1tate-wide remedial order requiring bilingual 1·n t t• 
ir.  l982) (reversing imposition 
. . . . s rue JOn to all M . A . h'l dren of hm1ted English proficiency; district court's ord t b 
ex1can- merican c 1 · 
on disputed stipulations). 
er 00 road and erroneously based 
8. No. 81-3622 (5th Cir., Sept. 7, 1982) (Brown R I ' eav ey, and Jolly, JJ.) (unreported). 
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slip opinions have made a checkerboard of my desk. I shall take it 
up first, following the time-honored distinction among practition­
ers between the "interesting cases" and the "other fellow's cases." 
I believe b y  critically evaluating my own case I can off er a few 
practice pointers for lawyers who read these pages, as well as re­
flect generally on the meaning of the first amendment. Obviously I 
suffer from the astigmatism of the advocate; a licked lawyer is of 
the same conviction still.9 But I leave to the reader final judgment 
on whether the views expressed here have merit or are merely 
blind musings to no good end. Chief Judge Brown, for whom I 
have the utmost respect, has written that the purpose of this "an­
nual looksee"10 is "to maintain the quality of the justice dis­
pensed."11 Those called to the task should therefore seek to better 
educate the judiciary and the profession as to what the law should 
be. It is as a partner, not as an adversary, that I make my first 
effort at surveying the constitutional work of the Fifth Circuit. 12 If 
I am critical of the court or of any of its decisions, I beg the reader 
to bear in mind Holmes's aper�u: "[O]ne may criticize even what 
one reveres. "13 
9. Of course, you should never begrudge judges who rule against you. As one seasoned 
practitioner has wisely put it: "It is a fine legal tradition to go to the tavern to cuss the 
judge when he decides against you, though assuredly it is unprofessional to stay mad at him 
more than 3 or 4 months." Frederick Bernays Wiener to Felix Frankfurter, May 8, 1964, 
Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress, Box 112, F older 002338 (qu o t ed by permission). 
10. Brown, Preface to [First] Fifth Circuit Review. 17 LOY. L. REV. 487 (1971). 
11. Brown, Dispensing Justice in the Fifth Circuit, 23 LoY. L. REV. 681 (1977): 
The ivory tower provides excellent opportunity to reflect and review from its height 
the law of the land below. Law review c ommentators illuminate the strengths and 
wea knesses of past decisions. In unexplored regions of the law the commentator may 
provide unparalleled guidance to both the practitioner and the court. Consequently, 
the law journal fulfills an important role in the maintenance of the quality of justice 
dispensed-it better educates the judiciary and the profession as to what the law 
should be. 
Id. at 684. 
12. Doubtless all who undertake survey work of this kind worry about entering into a 
dialogue with the court. It does seem presumptuous. But as Judge Rubin has recognized: 
In selecting specimens from the year's harvest, commenting on the memorable, iden· 
tifying trends that we as judges perhaps do not perceive, and criticizing both our 
errors in doctrine and what they consider to be our unjust or unwarranted conclu· 
sions, the authors and editors provide invaluable assistance. As judges we welcome 
their contribution, like all human beings we esteem their compliments, although we 
may sometimes find that their criticisms chafe. 
n.ubin, Introduction to Fifth Circuit Symposium, 25 Lov. L. REV. 441, 445 (1979). 
13. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 473 (1897). 
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. Theory and Practice 
In re Baier was an application for mandamus by a group of 
parents whose children attended Southdowns Elementary School 
in East Baton Rouge Parish. The school was o rdered closed pursu­
ant to a desegregation decree drawn up by Chief Judge John 
Parker of the Middle District of Louisiana. 14 As soon as the school 
was closed, Southdowns parents inquired o f  their elected repre­
sentatives on the School Board whether any member of the Board, 
its staff, or its consultants had ever suggested closing Southdowns 
Elementary School as a possible remedy in the Baton Rouge deseg­
regation case. The district court's opinion left the matter in doubt. 
Naturally the parents wanted to know whose idea it was to  close 
their school and the justifications for doing so. To their amazement 
the parents were told by their elected representatives that the dis­
trict court had forever barred members of the East Baton Rouge 
Parish School Board from disclosing to their constituents what was 
said or proposed during the unsuccessful settlement negotiations· 
that had been held at the federal courthouse. Although their repre­
sentatives wanted to talk about the negotiations, their lips were 
sealed. Several Southdown parents were lawyers; to them the dis­
trict court's silencing orders raised very serious first amendment 
questions. Nor could the lawyers find any precedent supporting the 
district court's perpetual ban beyond the termination of the nego­
tiations. No compelling reason suggests itself why citizens should 
be kept in the dark regarding what their elected representatives 
have been up to. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals struck down 
a similar district court confidentiality order that was issued in the 
name of protecting the secrecy of settlement negotiations· it consti­
tuted an unlawful prior restraint of speech in violation �f the first 
amendment.1a Rogers II, as it is called, has been followed in the 
Fifth Circu
.
it: it ?aving been twice cited in Chief Judge Godbold's 
e� b�nc opm!on .m B�rnard v. �ulf Oil Co., 16 which also declared a 
d1stnct court s silencmg orders m violation of the first d t 
C - 1 · d' · 1 d . 
amen men . 
ertam "! a JU 1c1a or er cut�mg off dialogu e  between the people and their elected representatives on a matter o f  such vital public 
14. Davis v. East �aton Rouge Parish School Bd., 514 F. S u  15  Rodgers v Umted States Steel Corp [ R  II pp. 869 (M.D. La. 1981). . . . ogers ] 536 F 2d 1001 (3d c· 976) 16. 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane) rev'd on 0;her g · d ir. 1 · ' roun s, 452 U.S. 89 (1981). 
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consequence as the loss of a school seems to strike at the core of 
the first amendment: 
What, then, does the First Amendment forbid? Here again the town 
meeting suggests an answer. That meeting is called to discuss and, 
on the basis of such discussion, to decide matters of public policy. 
For example, shall there be a school? Where shall it be located? ... 
When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else -who 
must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and dan· 
ger .... Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide 
an issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or 
doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so 
far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the 
general good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the 
community against which the First Amendment to the Constitution 
is directed. The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the 
necessities of  the program of self-government.17 
It is comforting-from the point of  view of general principle-that 
words written in 1948 by America's foremost first amendment 
thinker, Alexander Meiklejohn, should so neatly fit the problems of 
a future generation. A little later in his book, Free Speech and Its 
Relation to Self-Government, Professor Meiklejohn exposes the 
philosophical core of the first amendment: 
The primary purpose of the First Amendment is, then, that all the 
citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear 
upon our common life. That is why no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no 
belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information, may be kept from 
them. Under the compact upon which the Constitution rests, it is 
agreed that men shall not be governed by others, that they shall 
govern themselves.18 
To the lawyers it seemed that the district court's orders broke 
faith with the Framers. Any notion that the confidentiality orders 
were necessary to shield public officials from the consequences of 
their own actions is the antithesis of our system of representative 
self-government. In this circuit, Dinnan v. Board of Regents1' 
holds quite the contrary: 
If the decision-maker has acted for legitimate reasons, he has noth­
ing to fear. We find nothing heroic or noble about the appellant's 
17. A. MEIKLE.JOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 24, 26 (1948) 
(emphasis in original). 
18. Id. at 88-89. 
19. 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). 
652 Loyola Law Review 
[Vol. 29:647 
position [a claim of privilege from disclosure of ho� one vote� ��r­
ing a tenure meeting]; we see only an attempt to avoid respons1b�lt�y 
for his actions. If the appellant was unwill ing to accept responsibil­
ity for his actions, he should never have taken part in the tenure 
decision-making process. However, once he accepted such a role of 
public trust, he subjected himself to explaining to the public and 
any affected individual his decisions and the reasons behind them.20 
Enough theory. What to do about it-procedurally speaking-is a 
knot worth unraveling here, lest future first amendment claims be 
lost on the flypaper of procedure. 
Three steps came immed iately to mind : (1) mandamus, an ex­
traordinary remedy for an extraordinary case; (2) intervention in 
the desegregation case; (3) direct action for injunctive and declara­
tory relief. The first course seemed the right one, particularly in 
light of the ruling in Society of Professional Journalists v. Mar­
tin,21 in which the Fourth Circuit converted a complaint for in­
junctive and declaratory relief against a federal district court's si­
lencing order into a petition for a writ of m andamus. In the Fifth 
Circuit it is well settled that mandamus is an extraordinary rem­
edy; it will not be granted except upon a showing of compelling 
necessity and the lack of  any alternative a venues of relief,22 al­
though under United States u. Denson23 "whe n  the writ of manda­
mus is sought from an appellate court to confine a trial court to a 
lawful exercise of its prescribed authority, the court should issue 
the writ almost as a matter of course."24 But this still leaves the 
matter hanging. 
The reaction of the court was swift and succinct: "IT IS OR· 
DERED that the petition for writ of mandam us is DENIED."2G No 
reas?ns were as�i�ned for. �he denial of the writ. This left petition­ers m the agomzmg position of having to guess what lay in the 
court's mind.26 Was this an adjudication on the merits? If so, con-
20. 661 F.2d at 432. 
21. 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978) 22. FED. R. APP. P. 12. See Weber v Coney 642 F 2d 91 ( 
· 
524 F 2d 1004 (5th Cir 1975)· Stew d 
· 
W 
' · 5th Cir. 1981); In re Evans, 
· 
· 
• ar v. est, 449 F 2d 324 (5 h c· 23. 603 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1979) (en bane). 
· t ir. 1971). 
24. Id. at 1145 (emphasis added)_ See generally B Th United States Courts of Appeals: A Complex and Con
erger, e Mandamus Power of the 
31 BUFFALO L. REV. 37 (1982). fus
ed Means of Appellate Control, 
25. In re Baier, No. 81-3256 (5th Cir. May 11 198I) ( Politz, JJ.)(unreported). ' per Brown. C.J., Tate, and 
26. Of course it is always difficult to divine the · 
Cf. United States v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 1311, 1316 (5th��:
n�ng of �.n
e�plai�ed judicial action. 
· 
978) ( A Judge s statement of his 
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sidering the claims presented, silence seems a cavalier way of dis­
posing of the case. More likely, the panel may have thought man­
damus was not the proper vehicle for challenging the district 
court's orders, or the panel may have felt that, because the School 
Board had not objected to the trial court's confidentiality orders, 
the parents were in no position to complain. While the first 
amendment protects the right to hear as well as to speak, 27 there 
must be a willing speaker. At the time the mandamus petition was 
filed, the School Board had taken no action challenging Judge 
Parker's orders in any respect. Thus the court may have reasoned 
that the School Board's voluntary silence precluded the parents 
from asserting a right to listen. Before pursuing their case further, 
the Southdowns parents decided to await further School Board 
action. 
Meanwhile, another citizens group moved to intervene in the 
desegregation case for purposes of challenging the gag order; and 
on July 31, 1981, the School Board, through its attorney, formally 
moved the district court to lift its confidentiality orders. Interven­
tion was denied, however, with the trial court commenting: "What 
conceivable interest other than idle curiosity, can you possibly 
have in those discussions?" With respect to the School Board's re­
quest, the district judge declared that "[w]hatever they said, 
whatever they thought, whatever they said they thought, I do not 
intend will be held against them at any later date. "28 After reading 
the transcript of the July 31, 1981 proceedings, the Southdowns 
parents decided to renew their legal challenge. Suing a federal 
judge was a bold step, to be sure, but plaintiffs were determined 
somehow, some way, to have their first amendment claims adjudi­
cated on the merits. The Fifth Circuit's earlier unexplained refusal 
to issue mandamus left plaintiffs no realistic alternative, if they 
mental processes is absolutely unreviewable. This court has no means of observing mental 
process."). 
27. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) ("In a variety of contexts this 
Court has referred to a First Amendment right to 'receive information and ideas' "). Accord 
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) ("{t]his freedom . . .  necessarily protects the 
right to receive"). 
28. The district court added: 
"I am totally confounded by the interest, apparent interest in these settlement dis­
cussions which led to nothing. They led nowhere. They are over. They didn't work. It 
was apparently a bad idea on the part of Court." Record at 141 (July 31, 1981). A 
complete copy of the transcript on the School Board's motion to vacate the district 
court's perpetual confidentiality orders was attached as Appendix C to Appellants' 
Opening Brief in Baier v. Parker. 
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were to protect their rights, except to bring a direct action for de­
claratory and injunctive relief. 
Plaintiffs' civil action was filed on August :31, 1981. It was 
summarily dismissed, on Judge Polozola's own motion, without re­
quiring Chief Judge Parker to answer or tile any responsive plead­
ing. 29 Judge Polozola reasoned that judicial immunity barred plain­
tiffs' suit. Also, the Fifth Circuit's earlier denial of mandamus was 
said to be res judicata. Plaintiffs appealed; briefs were filed. The 
United States Government, representing Judge Parker, took the 
position that mandamus was the proper remedy, not a direct ac­
tion against the district court. But plaintiffs had tried that route 
without success. A year dra gged by. Then t he Southdowns parents 
asked for an expedited hearing on their appeal. A School Board 
election was set for September 11, 1982; the gag order had now 
thrown its cloak of silence over the scheduled election. Representa­
tives who wanted to talk about their records could not do so fully; 
voters faced the prospect of voting blindly; rumors abounded. But 
the Fifth Circuit would not budge. The request for an expedited 
hearing was denied. Appellants applied for a stay of the district 
court's orders pending appeal, but this too was denied. What 
started out as In re Baier, and what had wound its way back to the 
Fifth Circuit sub nom. Baier v. Parker, came to an abrupt end on 
September 7, 1982, when the court not only denied the stay, but 
ruled: "[T]reating the appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus, 
the petition is likewise DENIED, since the Court denied a like pe­
tition for mandamus on May 11, 1981 . . . . "30 This order is dizzy­
ing in its effect. 
A few general reflections and I'll move on. What can be said 
for the future, based on this otherwise unreported example? First, 
the rec�rd shows Southdowns parents were never accorded an op­
portumty to be heard on the merits of their claims-" t · any 
hn. al b . h 
, no m 
tee 1c sense ut wit respect to those fund t 1 ·re 
· h" 
amen a reqm · 
ments of fairness w ich are of the essence o f  d · 
d" · d" · 1 · t ,,31 g· 
ue process ma pro-cee mg JU 1c1a m na ure. mce the court's first denial of man-
29. Baier v. �arker, 523 F. Supp. 2� (M.D. La. l98l). 30. In re Baier, No. 81-3622 (5th Cir. Sept. 7 1982) ( 31. Per Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes M un reported). 1, 19 (1938). See also Morgan v. United States: 29�
rg
{;� 
v .  United States, 304 U.S. 
Hughes, C.J.): · · 468, 480-81 (1936) (per 
The requirement of a "full hearing" has obvious re� 
ed. . h' h 'd . 
erence t o  the t d't· f . d' . I proce mgs m w 1c ev1 ence 1s received and we· h d r� 1 10n o JU 1c1a "hearing" is designed to afford the safeg uard that th
ig e by the trier of facts. The e one who decides shall be bound 
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damus can be explained on any number of grounds having nothing 
to do with the merits, it is the law of the Fifth Circuit that, "we 
are loath to assume that the denial of the writ [of mandamus] 
without opinion was a determination on the merits of the claimed 
jurisdictional error."32 The Supreme Court of the United States 
has also ruled that the denial without opinion of an extraordinary 
writ "does not constitute, and cannot be fairly read as, an adjudi­
cation on the merits of the claim presented."33 The court's second 
peremptory denial of mandamus likewise leaves too many ques­
tions of law and fact unanswered. Worse yet, it appears to us that, 
under the court's ruling, citizens of Baton Rouge were deprived of 
precious first and fifth amendment rights, and of the right to cast 
an informed ballot, all without according them their constitutional 
day in court. A total of six Circuit Courts of Appeals have held 
mandamus available in circumstances similar to those confronting 
the Southdowns group as a result of the district court's perpetual 
gag.34 Justice required more than darkling silence from the Fifth 
Circuit in the face of petitioners' claims. Citizens who have lost 
their schools a11d \Yant to know why are entitled, under the first 
amendment, to the fullest measure of enlightment: "Secrecy is not 
congenial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness gives too slender 
in good conscience to consider the evidence, to be guided by that alone, and to reach 
his conclusion uninfluenced by extraneous considerations which in other fields might 
have play in determining purely e xecutive action. The "hearing" is the hearing of 
evidence and argument. If the one who determines the facts which underlie the order 
has not considered evidence or argument, i t  is manifest that the hearing has not been 
given. 
32. Key v. Wise, 629 F.2d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir. 1980). 
33. Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 488 (1975). 
34. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (district court order prohibiting 
Parties and counsel from making any extra-judicial statements about information produced t
�rough discovery held a proper subject for mandamus; writ issued and order declared in violation of first amendment); United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978); 
Society Professional Journalists v. Martin, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Rogers v. United States Steel Corp. [Rogers II), 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 
1976); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (district court's order prohibiting 
Parties to a civil action from discussing the case with members of the news media or the PUhlic was proper subject for mandamus; order declared in violation of first amendment); 
Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970) (order of district court prohibiting defen­dants and their attorneys from making any public statements in relation to case constituted clear abuse of discretion and was proper subject for mandamus; district court's order de­clared in violation of first amendment). See also Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 
F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) (federal district court's "no com­
lll.ent" rules applicable to lawyers in civil litigation held in violation of the first amendment, 
With the Seventh Circuit noting that "The need for informed and complete discussion ... far outweighs any possible benefit that might accrue in terms of maintaining the laboratory 
conditions of a civil trial." Id. at 258). 
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Incidentally, desegregation in the dark ended quietly in Baton 
Rouge at 4:05 p.m. C.S.T. on Monday, Nove1?ber 22� 1982. A y�ar 
and a half after the district court extended its gag m perpetmty, 
the following order was spread upon the record: "The Court having 
considered the matter sua sponte and having concluded that the 
circumstances which made them necessary no longer exist, the or­
der dated March 11, 1981 and all supplements and amendments 
thereto are hereby vacated and set aside." Two weeks later, the 
Fifth Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en bane in Baier v. 
Parker without a word. Of course, lifting the gag order came too 
late: "Fragile First Amendment rights," the Fifth Circuit has rec­
ognized, "are often lost or prejudiced by delay."38 Southdowns Ele­
mentary remains closed. 
Now for the other fellow's cases. In re Express Ne ws37 held 
unconstitutional Local Rule 500-2 of the United S tates District 
Court for the Western District of Texas, which flatly prohibited 
any person, including the press, from interviewing any juror con­
cerning the deliberations of a jury in a criminal case. The local rule 
constituted an unlawful abridgment of the first amendment right 
of the press to gather news and the corollary right of the public to 
receive information. The court's opinion builds on Supreme Court 
precedent, principally Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Vir­
ginia" and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,39 both of 
which vouchsafe the news-gathering rights of the press. "Govern­
ment-imposed secrecy," said Judge Rubin, "denies the free flow of 
information and ideas not only to the press but also to the pub­
lic. "•0 The public's "right to ... receive" information, noted the 
court, has been repeatedly recognized and applied to a vast variety 
of information.41 There are countervailing considerations, however. 
:Jfl 
. .  Anti-Facial Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951) (per Frankfurter, J., 
rnncurrm1). See alao Juatice Brandeia'a comment: "Sunlight is said to be the best of disin· 
r�·lAnt.; electric li1ht the beet policeman." TH• WORDS or JUSTICE BRANDEIS 151 (S. 
l.olclman ed. 1963). Compare White Rabbit to Alice, quoted in L. PAPER BRANDEIS 42 1191\:l): ""Public buain- OIJCht to be conducted in private because what w� do here isn't 1m1�•rlant enouah lo be made public, and private buaineta should be made public because if 11 •�r" k•pl private the puhlic wouldn't know about it." :If!. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d at 470. :r; fl!lfi •'.2d H07 (flth Cir. 1982). 
:ui 4:1.'> 11 .S. 1129 (19711). 
:111 4!17 11.S. M�I (1982). 
40 flllfl r.2d al H09. 
41 Id At thia point .
• Judie Rubin dropped I footnote that painstakingly rehearses a 
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Unlike Mr. Justice Black, for whom "no law" meant "no law,"42 
Judges Rubin, Johnson, and Williams ally themselves with the 
school that judges by balancing first amendment rights against 
competing concerns. An accused's sixth amendment right to a fair 
trial comes to mind. "Like other First Amendment rights, the right 
to gather news is not, of course, absolute,"43 said the court. But 
any rule of court blocking the free flow of information must be 
"narrowly tailored to prevent a substantial threat to the adminis­
tration of justice."•• The rule i n  question failed this test. It swept 
too broadly, being unlimited in time and scope, applying alike to 
jurors anxious to talk and to those desiring privacy, and foreclosing 
questions about jurors' general reactions as well as specific ques­
tions about jurors' votes that might, under some compelling cir­
cumstances, be inappropriate. The burden rests upon government, 
and in this instance upon the district court, to justify the need for 
curtailment, not the other way around: "A court may not impose a 
restraint that sweeps so broadly and then require those who would 
speak freely to justify special treatment by carrying the burden of 
showing good ca us�. "4G The first amendment is good cause enough. 
In re Express News arose on mandamus, which the court, cit­
ing the law of the Ninth Circuit,'8 ruled was the appropriate rem­
edy. When a federal district court's rule is the subject matter in 
controversy, it is generally the United States Attorney who puts up 
the defense. This procedure preserves an adversarial setting while 
avoiding the unseemliness of requiring the district court to defend 
itself on mandamus. The appellate court was unpersuaded by the 
argument that freedom of debate and independence of thought 
would be jeopardized if jurors knew their arguments and ballots 
total of fifteen Supreme Court cases, from Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) 
{right to receive handbills) to Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
447 U.S. 557 (1980) (advertising that promotes the use of electricity). 
42. 
Some people would have you believe that this is a very radical position, and maybe it 
is. But all I am doing is following what to me is the clear wording of the First Amend­
ment that 'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the 
press.' These words follow Madison's admonition that there are some powers the peo­
ple did not mean the federal government to have at all. As I have said innumerable 
times before I simply believe that 'Congress shall make no law' means Congress shall 
make no law. 
Ii. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 45 (1969). 
43. 695 F.2d at 809. 
44. Id. at 810. 
45. Id. 
46. United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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would be published to the world. The challenged rule was a blun­
derbuss; it categorically denied all access for all purposes, and for 
all time, not merely disclosure of b allots.47 In re Express News was 
decided the same month the court denied petitions for rehearing 
and rehearing en bane in Baier v. Parker. Would that it had come 
down sooner, but such is the fortuity of the flow. 
Agreeing with the Third Circuit's conclusion that the same so­
cietal interests that mandate a first amendment right o f  access to 
criminal trials apply to pretrial criminal proceedings, the court in 
United States v. Chagra48-with Judge Rubin writing-extended 
this right of access to bail reduction hearings held i n  court or in 
other places traditionally open to the public. The Third and Ninth 
Circuits have recognized a first-amendment right to attend pretrial 
suppression hearings,49 and the District of Columbia C ourt of Ap­
peals has held the press and public enjoy a first amendment right 
of access to pretrial detention hearings.50 True, bond reduction 
hearings do not have a history o f  public access; often bail is set 
informally and not always in open court. But the court recognized 
that history is not determinative: "[TJhe first amendment must be 
interpreted in the context of current values and conditions,"51 we 
are told. This utterance is one of the most dramatic penned during 
the term. The first amendment is n ot static; its meaning is not to 
be cabined to the values and conditions of 1791. Recognition of a 
right of access, however, does not fix the judicial scales "beyond 
counterweight. "52 The court repeated its earlier observation that 
the first amendment, despite its categorical language, is not an ab­
solute: "There is no single divine constitutional right to whose 
reign all others are subject."53 The opinion lists the circumstances 
under which a trial court may lawfully exclude the press from bail 
reduction hearings.a. In the instant case, the district judge prop­
erly excluded the press on findings of likely prejudice and a lack of 
alternatives to closure. 
47. 695 F.2d at 810. 
48. 701 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1983). 
, . 
49. llni�ed States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1169-71 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Criden, 675 F .2d 550, 555 (3d Cir.1982). 
r10. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en bane). r11. 701 F.2d at 363. 
r12. Id. at :164. 
r,:1. ld. at :165. 
h r>4. _ Td. (" ( 1 ! I defendant's! right to a fair trial will likely be prejudiced by conducting l " h:arinK pubh�ly; (2) alternatives to closure cannot protect defendant's fair trial right; nnd (.I) rloffure will probably be effective in protecting against the perceived danger.") 
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This Chagra case has a procedural twist worthy of note. An 
appellate court is rarely presented an issue without an opponent, 
but it happened here. The defendant lost interest in the case after 
his guilty plea. The prosecution never supported closure. Who, 
then, was there to oppose the newspapers on appeal? Moreover, 
was it open to the media, though not a party to the case, to appeal 
the closure order, or must the press seek other avenues of review? 
The court solved the first problem by appointing an amicus curiae 
to defend the decision of the district court. That was a creative 
step, and under the collateral order doctrine, the court held it open 
for the press to contest closure orders by taking an appeal.1111 If the 
question were an open one, Judge Rubin would have required re­
view by mandamus, not by interlocutory appeal. Mandamus is 
quicker, and time is of the essence in first amendment cases.116 But 
the settled adjective law of the Fifth Circuit allows both modes of 
review, and the panel was obliged to fall in line. 
B. Adult Theaters 
To paraphrase Chief Justice Marshall only slightly, "The 
power to zone is the power to destroy."117 In Basiardanes v. City of 
GalvestonH the court struck down Ordinance 78-1, which flatly 
banned adult theaters from all of the central business district and 
which, in its effect, squeezed Mr. Basiardanes and company into an 
industrial patchwork of swamps, warehouses, and railroad tracks. 
Basiardanes wanted to lease his downtown building to a movie 
concern called Universal Amusements Company, an outfit that 
traded in adult motion pictures that were not obscene. The pro­
posed theater lay across the street from a major renovation of Gal­
veston's Grand Opera House. City officials moved quickly to block 
Basiardanes's efforts by passing its new ordinance which was 
55. Id. at 358-60. 
56. Id. at 360 n.15. 
57. Or, as the Great Chief Justice put it in announcing McCulloch v .  Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819): "[T)he power to tax involves the power to destroy"-words 
that Marshall borrowed verbatim from Webster's oral argument in the case. See 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) at 327 ("An unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy"). But 
see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's comment, concurring in Graves v. N.Y. ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 
U.S. 466, 490 (1939): "The web of unreality spun from Marshall's famous dictum was 
brushed away by one stroke of Mr. Justice Holmes's pen: 'The power to tax is not the power 
to destroy while this Court sits.' Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218, 223 
(dissent).'' 
58. 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982 ). 
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modeled after the Detroit la w upheld by the_ 
Supreme Cou
.
rt in 
Young u. American Mini Theaters.r,9 The City fa�hers believe� 
that a nexus existed between adult theaters and crime; the ordi­
nance was aimed, purportedly, at red ucing crime. But the court, 
distinguishing Detroit's case, sa w the matter d i_
tfere�tly. Ordi
.
narily 
the power to zone is subject to minimal overs ight ; Judges will ap­
prove zoning regulations as long as they a re ra�ionally related. 
to 
legitimate state interests,60 and one would th m k that reducing 
crime in do wntown Galveston is a legitimate i nterest . But here the 
ordinance touched activity protected by the first amendment, viz., 
the showing of non-obscene adult movies. Galveston, in its wisdom, 
had defined "adult theater" as any theater from which children 
unaccompanied by an a dult are excluded under Texas law. This 
bizarre scheme reduces the adult population to seeing only what is 
fit for children, which the court thought too constr icting. "By peg­
ging its definition of adult theaters to Texa s  la w on obscenity for 
minors, Galveston's regulation of adult thea ters sweeps broadly 
into the area protected by the First Arnendment."61 American 
Mini Theaters was not controlling, since the Galveston ordinance 
not only dispersed adult theaters but effectively drove them off 
Galveston Island altogether. 63 The court's rejection of the alleged 
crime nexus is a bold step, theoretically speaking. The mere asser­
tion of a state interest is not enough. "The City must buttress its 
assertion with evidence that the state interest has a basis in fact 
and that the factual basis was considered by the city in passing the 
ordinance. "88 Nothing i n  the record indicated to the court that Or­
dinance 78-1 was passed after a weighing of the effects of adult 
thea�rs on urb.an life. The "empty record"6• before Galveston City officials stood m stark contrast to the facts of the Detroit case. 
The�e the legislative record was laden with the testimony of soci­olo�1sts
. 
and urban planners. One wonders why Galveston, or any leg1�lative bod� for that matter, cannot adopt by reference the findmgs of a sister state or even of a dist a nt · · d' t' The d f d 1 I . 1 . JUr1s 1c ion. sprea o mo e eg1s ation would be seri'ousl t · t d d . Y res r1c e , an un-fortunately so, were it necessary to rebuild th I · l t. d e eg1s a 1ve recor , so 
59. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
60. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S 1 ( . . . Stansberry v. Holmes, 613 F.2d 1 285 (5th Cir.1980). 
· 1 974). In the Fifth Circuit, see 
61. 682 F.2d at 1213. 
62. Id. at 1213-14. 
63. Id. at 1215. 
64. Id. 
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to speak, in each instance by the testimony of experts. 811 But surely 
the court is right, in this case, to probe the motives of city officials. 
Both the timing of the ordinance and its history pretty plainly 
show that the real reason Galveston objected to the proposed thea­
ter was its location next to the Grand Opera House, not its nexus 
to crime. Protection of the Opera House is a legitimate goal, said 
the court, but it is not one with the same weight as safe streets, 
"nor is it one that entitles the City to squelch free speech. "66 Ordi­
nance 78-1 also unconstitutionally suppressed Biasiardanes's free­
dom to advertise. All he wanted to do was to hang a sign saying 
"ADULT THEATER" on his facade-a harmless gesture, rea­
soned the court. Commercial speech, once excluded from first 
amendment coverage, now enjoys constitutional protection.67 Ban­
ning all advertising of adult theaters, regardless of content, goes 
too far. Nothing in Basiardanes's simple sign depicted the "cellu­
loid delights" within the theater; he was therefore entitled to nom­
inal damages-no actual damages having been shown-for breach 
of his first amendment right to advertise.68 The court noted, how­
ever, that under Carey v. Phiphus,89 a case that every civil liberties 
lawyer would do well to read, attorneys' fees awards may be sup­
ported by an award of nominal damages. The court also remanded 
for trial on the claim of lost lease revenues, since there was evi­
dence in the record of some actual injury to Basiardanes's 
pocketbook. 70 
65. Cf. Tobacco Accessories v. Treen, 681 F.2d 378, 380 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982) (sustaining 
Louisiana's Drug Paraphernalia Law, which was patterned after the Model Drug Parapher­
nalia Act drafted by the United States Department of Justice. Judge Politz's opinion, which 
upholds Louisiana's Paraphernalia Law, quoted extensively from Congressional hearings 
and from the statement of a United States Deputy Assistant Attorney General in support of 
the Model Act). 
66. 682 F.2d at 1216. 
67. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
Cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
68. 682 F.2d at 1219-20. 
69. 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978). See generally Note, Promoting the Vindication of 
Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 346 (1980). Closer 
to home, readers interested in exploring the matter of the fee should have a look at Judge 
Rubin's opinion for the court in Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1980), which 
holds too low a $30 per hour fee under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 and Supp. V. 1981); $50 per hour was more reasonable, said the court. 
70. 682 F.2d at 1220 n.22. 
662 Loyola Law Review 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A. Dog Sniffing in the Schools 
[Vol. 29:647 
There is more to Horton v. Goose Creek Ind. Scho?l.District'1 
than first meets the eye. Actually, two Horton opm10ns were 
handed down during the term, some five months apart. Hort?n I,n 
decided on June 1, 1982, is first-rate judicial craftsmansh�p. �y 
that I mean it treats the question presented-whether a dog s smff 
is a "search"-with a freshness of approach and wi th breathtaking 
dexterity. I realize that comparisons are invidious, but those whose 
lives have been touched by the work of John Minor Wisdom will 
doubtless excuse my praising him here by reference to his Horton 
opinions. There is much to learn about the judicial process behind 
these two slip opinions. 
Horton I held that the sniff of a drug-detecting dog "must be 
recognized as a search governed by the fourth amendment. "73 Lit­
tle did it matter to Wisdom, J., that a mountain of authorities, 
including the Second and Seventh Circuits, had reached the con­
trary conclusion. What mattered most to the panel-Judges Ran­
dall and Tate sat aside their brother-was reasoning, not recital of 
authority. The decided cases were confused theoretically, said the 
panel, and in the face of this confusion the court was hesitant to 
extend the rule that canine sniffing is not a s earch to dragnet snif­
fing operations in the schools "simply on the basis of precedent."" 
Instead, Judge Wisdom chose to "analyze the p roblem afresh and 
determine whether the sniffing offends reasonable expectations of 
privacy."711 To say that Judge Wisdom's opinion thoroughly can­
vasses the authorities-rejecting some, building on others-is not 
to do him, and presumably his clerks, justice. One can only marvel 
at the case law surgically dissected in the opinion and in the notes. 
The panel rejects the analog� to a police officer smelling marijuana 
smoke. Some courts say a smffing dog is no different from a human 
being, or they say the dog's olfactory sense merely "enhances" the 
senses of the policeman, in the same way a flashlight enhances 
71. 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.1982) (on petition for reheari ) d · d S Ct 3536 (1983). ng , cert. enie ' 103 . . 
72. 677 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1982) (per Wisdom, J., Randall and T 73. Id. at 480. ate, JJ.). 
74. Id. at 477. 
75. Id. at 477-78. 
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sight.76 Of course, this is a false  analogy. "Nick's nose did not en­
hance Detective Berks's senses; it replaced them," the Ninth Cir­
cuit opined shortly before Horton I came down.77 Judge Wisdom 
says of the same false analogy: "We find this reasoning unpersua­
sive."78 Here is judging, let it be said, in the grand manner. The 
sniffing of a dog is unquestionably different from the sniffing of a 
human being; otherwise law enforcement agencies would not invest 
resources in training the animals. Judge Wisdom describes drug­
sniffing dogs as "giant olfactory nerves,"79 and his figure certainly 
fits the facts. The dog permits the officer to detect data otherwise 
imperceptible to human senses, and, unlike flashlights, drug-snif­
fing dogs are generally not in use in society. Therefore, on reason­
ing, if not authority, the court held the sniff a search.80 
But there is something very unsettling about the opinion in 
Horton I. One of the authorities listed among those whose reason­
ing the panel questions is United States v. Goldstein,81 which, sur­
prisingly, turns out to be an earlier panel decision of the same 
Fifth Circuit. Doubtless Judge Wisdom's attempt to distinguish 
Goldstein and his criticism of its reasoning stirred up the col­
leagues. Five months later, on petition for rehearing, Horton I was 
withdrawn and Horton II was substituted in its place. In the Fifth 
Circuit no panel is free to disregard earlier decisions, however sus­
pect their reasoning.82 On rehearing, Judge Wisdom was obliged to 
follow Goldstein and follow it he did: "We find Goldstein to be 
controlling on the question of whether the dogs' sniffing of student 
lockers in public hallways and automobiles parked on public park­
ing lots was a search."83 It thus continues to be the law in the Fifth 
76. See, e.g., United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 
U.S. 962 (198 1 ). 
77. United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and re­
manded, 103 S. Ct. 3529 (1983) (for reconsideration in light of United States v. Place, 103 S. 
Ct. 2637 (1983)). 
78. 677 F.2d at 478. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 480. 
81. 635 F.2d at 356 (per Frank M. Johnson, J., Kravitch and Allgood, JJ.). 
82. As Judge Tate has pointed out, the Fifth Circuit follows "the strict circuit prece­
dent policy, which requires all subsequent panels to follow even an isolated earlier panel 
precedent until it is overruled by en bane consideration . . . .  " Tate, The Last Year of the 
"Old" Fifth (1891-1981), 27 Lov. L. REV. 689, 690 (1981) (citing Spinkellink v. Wainright, 
596 F.2d 637, 638 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 477 n.23 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978)).  
83. 690 F.2d at 477 (per curiam). That Horton II was handed down per c�iam is 
further evidence the panel was bowing to the Fifth Circuit's iron-clad rule of stare decisis. 
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Circuit, as well as elsewhere, that dog sniffing o
f airport luggage or 
student lockers is not a search. 
To this outside observer, Horton I was a bold effort-too bold 
some would say-to rewrite the law of the Fifth Circuit by indirec­
tion.84 A very wise judge once remarked within my hearing, "If you 
don't like a case, distinguish it." But there are limits to the crea­
tive capacity of even our greatest judges. That is one lesson, as I 
read them, in these two Horton opinions. Another lesson is that 
without judges willing to criticize the law as they find it, without a 
wholesome measure of thinking in the reports, fiat tends to replace 
reasoning in law. One need only read the latest word from the Su­
preme Court on the matter of dog sniffing to realize the value of 
thinking in print to sound judgment. The canine sniff is sui 
generis, says the Court, in one fleeting paragraph o f  obiter that as­
suredly will control the future.u It is now the law of the 
land-unfortunately without the benefit of briefing or oral argu­
ment-that canine sniffing of luggage is not a "search" within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment. For what it's worth, this lowly 
surveyor prefers the craftsmanship of Horton I. 
Of course, sniffing a person is quite different from sniffing a 
locker, in terms of its general offensiveness and one's expectation 
of privacy. Judge Wisdom has made it clear, and there is no disa­
greement about it, that dragnet sniffing of students in the schools 
is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 86 On this 
point, the Fifth Circuit stands in unison against the law of the Sev­
enth Circuit, and justifiably so. "We need only look at the record 
in this case to see how a dog's sniffing technique-i.e . ,  sniffing 
around each child, putting his nose on the child and scratching and 
manifesting other signs of excitement in the case o f  an alert-is 
intrusive," said
.
the court in Horton Il.87 Certainly, the thought of 
a Dober�an. pmscher marching up and down the aisles of my daughter s sixth grade class and poking its nose up against her 
S
w 84· Cf. Baker, Prece
.
�e�t .
Tim�s !hree: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 
d
'.�·\�87, �3: (1981) ( D1stmguishmg Fifth Circuit holding from Fifth Circuit dictum is 8 1 
8
�u 
U
ta� 
d 
0� any court, and one often incapable of satisfactory performance."). 
· .1 mte ted tates v: Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983). A week later the Supreme Court �:::::�� v::� 
re
�:
d
r::t:h Circuit'.s jud�ment in United States v. Beale, i.e., a dog's sniff 
the Ninth 'c,·rcu1't ·11 h 
or recons1d�ration. 103 S. Ct. at 3529. It appears. inevitable that WI ave to recant its h Id' · d f · lum. So it goeH. 
0 mg m e erence to the Supreme Court's dic-
86. 690 F.2d at 479. 
87. Id. 
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strikes me as frightening. It will take more than the fiction of in 
loco parentis, which Judge Wisdom expressly rejects,88 to convince 
this parent that dog sniffing in the schools is all right. But one 
parent's personal view, even a judge's for that matter, is not the 
test. Under the fourth amendment, the test is reasonableness. 
Drawing an analogy to Terry v. Ohio, the opinion in Horton II goes 
on to apply a balancing approach whereby the intrusiveness of the 
search is weighed against the need for information, and a standard 
of "reasonable cause" based on individualized suspicion is laid 
down. 89 "The intrusion on dignity and personal security that goes 
with the type of canine inspection of the student's person involved 
in this case cannot be justified by the need to prevent abuse of 
drugs and alcohol when there is no individualized suspicion, and 
we hold it unconstitutional."90 Thus, in the Fifth Circuit, the 
fourth amendment has not gone entirely to the dogs. And even 
locker-sniffing dogs, under Horton II, must be "reasonably relia­
ble," a matter that was left open on remand for development of an 
olfactory record.91 The Supreme Court denied certiorari92 in Hor­
ton II, and there the matter rests. 
III. OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 
A. Dress Codes in the Schools 
First a word about beards g enerally. Socrates, who was a great 
teacher, wore one.98 But he lived in a different time ,  at a different 
place. Charles Evans Hughes, undoubtedly the greatest Chief Jus­
tice in the twentieth century up to now, wore one. It was a matter 
88. Id. at 480 n.18. 
89. Id. at 481. 
90. Id. at 481-82. 
91. Id. at 482. 
92. 103 S. Ct. 3536 (1983). 
93. Reginald Reynolds in his painstaking history of beards says, apropos "Of the 
Beard Philosophic": 
Pliny speaks of the respect and fear inspired by the beard of Euphrates, a Syrian 
philosopher, and Strabo says much the same of the bearded Gymnosophists. The 
Beard Philosophic, whereby every man could grow as long a beard as Socrates 
deemed himself as good a philosopher, survived into the shaven age. Of such beards 
the younger Pliny wrote when he praised that of the philosopher Euphrates . . . a 
philosopher without a bearde was very lyttell estemed. 
R. REYNOLDS, BEARDS: THEIR SOCIAL STANDING, RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT, DECORATIVE Pos­
SIBILITIES, AND VALUE IN OFFENSE AND DEFENSE THROUGH THE AGES 4 0  (1949) (emphasis in 
original). 
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f Convenience with him, and it contributed to
 Hughes's image. 0 h . .  1 ? "  H h "Why does the public regard me as a u�a? 1c1c
 e · u? es onc,e 
sked a friend. There were two reasons: First, the pubhc doesn t 
�now you. Second, you wear a full �eard."94 � little later in h.is 
hirsute career Chief Justice Hughes s fan mail was exceeded m 
volume only by Huey Long's-when the latter was i n  the Senate. 
One admirer merely drew a picture of the famous whiskers on a 
card. It reached Hughes without name or address.911 One wonders 
what Socrates or Chief Justice Hughes would think of a rule re­
quiring all teachers to shave their beards? Shave them they must 
in Rapides Parish, Louisiana. 
I 'm told by friends that life is different in Rapides Parish 
from,  say, life in New Orleans.  Perhaps this explains why the 
Rapides School Board, in its wisdom, voted to apply its Student 
Dress Code to all employees in the system, from janitors and bus 
drivers on up to tenured teachers. Judge Thornberry's opinion in 
Damico v. Rapides Parish School Board96 sustained the School 
Board's policy against beards as a "reasonable means of furthering 
the school board's undeniable interest in teaching hygiene, instil­
ling discipline, asserting authority, and compelling uniformity."97 
But doubts linger. True, a decade ago in Karr v. Schmidt,98 the 
Fifth Circuit held en bane that hygiene, discipline, asserting au­
thority, and compelling uniformity are legitimate c oncerns of the 
school board. But Karr trimmed students' hair, not teachers'. And 
in the Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College99 case, again en bane, the 
court reasoned that the right of junior college students to choose 
their mode of personal hair grooming was within "the great host of 
liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from arbitrary 
!ltate action. " 1 00 Thus college students are free to wea r  their hair as 
they see fit in the Fifth Circuit. In  1975, in the Handler v. San 
Jacint o  Ju nior College 101  case, a nother panel applied the reasoning 
of /,ansd.a le to strike down a junior college's regulation prohibiting 
the wearing of beards among faculty. "School authorities may reg­
ulate teachers' appearance and activities only when the regulation 
!l·I. 1 . M .  l' l lst:v, <'llAKl.I:� EVANH HUGHES 377 ( 1951 ). %. I I  Id. nt tili6. 
!M; i;7;, r.�rl 100, ri·h 'ii d1•nird 680 F.2d 1 389 (5th Cir. 1982). !17 /rl. nl 1 02  
!IH ·Ifill F .'.!d tim 1 :,th Cir. 1 972)  (en bane), cert. denied 409 '1 S 989 ( 1972) ·�1  ·l<O F · • t f '<  ' h . .  . 
' '- · . . 
 · · - '  '".J ( .Jt Cir. 1972) (en hanc), cert. denied 4 1 1  U S  986 ( 1973) l l M )  /<I. At fifi:I ' ' ' ' 
1 1 1 1  :. i • i  F ·�ct "7:1 l !'1th C ' ir .  1 97!'1) .  
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has some relevance to legitimate administrative or educational 
functions," said the Handler court.102 "The mere subjective belief 
in a particular idea by public e mployers is, however, an undeniably 
insufficient justification for the infringement of a constitutionally 
guaranteed rig ht. "103 The Handler court thought it "illogical to 
conclude that a teacher's bearded appearance would jeopardize his 
reputation or pedagogical effectiveness with college students 
• • •
• "104 One wonders what the connection is, in point of fact, be­
tween the Rapides Parish School Board's ban of beards on all of its 
employees and any educational aim? Certainly Socrates's example 
suggests that one can wear a beard and still teach effectively. Chief 
Justice Hughes's beard, if  anything, added to his authority. What 
kind of beard are we talking about? A neatly trimmed Vandyke 
would seem to pose no threat to personal hygiene. And to say that 
requiring a b us driver in Rapides Parish to shave his beard will 
promote discipline sounds preposterous. Whose discipline are we 
talking about anyway, the students or the employees? That is 
never made clear in the discussion. Focusing a trifle harder on the 
purposes of the rule and its relation, genuine or not, to the aims of 
the school board may expose weakness lying only slightly beneath 
the surface of what appears to be rubber-stamp analysis. 
This latest hair case falls somewhere in between the estab­
lished precedents. It concerns the liberty of adults, not children. 
But the context is the grade and high school, not the junior college. 
Generally w hen a court is caught in the middle of its own holdings 
finer lines will have to be drawn. But in Domico u. R a pides Parish ��hool Board, Judge Thornberry distinguishes Handler, which he Joined, on the basis of what he perceives to be a n  established "bright line" applicable to hair cases between the high school door 
and the college gate. "[l]n the public elementary and secondary 
schools, such regulations are always justified b y  the school's 
needs,"1015 says the court, but the opinion never explains why. We 
are told the school board has made "a quite rational determination 
to liniit its emp loyees' choice of hairstyle, and we therefore will not 
102. Id. at 277. 
loa. Id. 
104. Id. 
8 
105. 675 F.2d at 102. But see Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protections For Per­
hollQl Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 605-06 (1977) ("But proper due process analysis p�tdly stops with the abstract finding of a legitimate state interest. Where regulation im-011ll�es on a constitutional right-here, that of appearance-the means chosen by the state 
g t significantly to further the announced state objectives."). 
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intervene,"'oe but again this leaves the m
ain question in the 
case-the relationship between the challenge
d rule and its 
aims-unanswered. Kelley v. Johnson, 
107 which is quoted but not 
discussed, is a policeman's hair case, and therefore distinguishable. 
Police wear uniforms; tenured teachers generally wear what they 
please. In Kelley, Justice Rehnquist emphasized: "The overwhelm­
ing majority of state and local police of the present day are uni­
formed."108 Kelley said nothing at all about applying student dress 
codes to adult teachers. 
The only other case relied on by Judge Thornberry, a Seventh 
Circuit opinion109 by then Judge (now Justice) Stevens, is also dis­
tinguishable, and in a crucial respect. Judge Stevens expressly re­
served the question whether "a specific form of dress or exposure 
may be required or totally prohibited,"no and he cited among 
other instances of "intolerable required conformity"m the official 
prohibition of beards during the reign of Peter the Great.112 The 
Domico opinion ends by quoting the following passage from the 
law of the Seventh Circuit: 
If a school board should correctly conclude that a teacher's style of 
dress or plumage, has an adverse impact on the educational process, 
and if that conclusion conflicts with the teacher's interest in select­
ing his own lifestyle, we have no doubt that the interest of the 
teacher is subordinate to the public interest.113 
T�e key word, of course, is "correctly," and while all would agree 
with Judge Thornberry that " [t]he same may be said about other 
school system employees, such as bus drivers,""" some may per-
106. 675 F.2d at 102. 
107. 425 U.S. 238 (1976). 
108 Id. at 248. 
: 1� �ii�: �4���1 District No. 167, Cook County, Ill., 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974). 
1 1 1 .  Id. at 661i n.25. 
I !:.!. .•;,.,. 11rnnally Vil W. & A. DURANT THE S 
l .c1trlM X I V .  al :1911 ( 1 96:1) ( Pet.er the 
• . TORY OF CIVILIZATION: THE AGE 
OF 
1 1 r ·-' . 
Great shaved his own beard in 1698· beardlessness was 
" ,.. • •ll(n " m11uernity of willingness to te . 
' 
phiht 0r .J.,,...ph !'aimer A . , �n r into Western civilization). Compare the 
· · . 
' menca A outstanding champion of the beard · � •w m•n in hiolury have heen rA d 
· 
t ... ar.t ,.. " •\·mhol or individual '::'ee:
cute a� he �as for courageously defending his 
'""' whv I Wf'Ar il · ha Id 
" fom against rigid small-town conformity. 'I'll tell . . � wou aay I anyo t II v•ar ,..·rap .. lh•ir rar�• fr 
' ne can e me why other men 365 days a 
. . . · nm no11e to neck.' 11 Sl!\'UN. I ur. l .oNc; ANO SHOllT or IT· F 
'l'2 1 1  !17 1 1  
' IVE THOUSAND YEARS OF FUN AND FURY OVER HAIR 
1 LI ,\Ii /Irr. 4% t'.2d at 667 (em h · 
1 1  • i; - •  , . . ,_. 
P &11 s added). 
' • 1 r •" Al 1 02. 
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ceive that the quotation begs the very question at issue. There is a 
fleeting reference to "the evidence below,"m but what it shows no­
where appears in the opinion. With all respect, the Domico opinion 
jumps too quickly to its conclusion; nor is it clear that Fifth Cir­
cuit case law, or the controlling law of the Supreme Court, "com­
pels"116 the court's two-page affirmance. Damico therefore is a case 
that shows how resorting to bright lines often risks obscuring real 
difficulties. 
B. Public Employment and Procedural Due Process 
Shawgo v. Spradlin117 rejects both a procedural and substan­
tive due process challenge to the temporary suspensions of two 
Amarillo police officers, and the permanent demotion from ser­
geant to patrolman of one of them. Their cohabiting together 
outside marriage was in violation of catch-all department rules 
proscribing conduct that "if brought to the attention of the public, 
could result in justified unfavorable criticism of that member or 
the department. "118 This is a very hard case on its facts because 
other Amarillo police officers commonly engaged in the same prac­
tice without penalty, and the conduct in question was expressly 
approved by a supervisor of one of the officers. Moreover, Judge 
Tate's opinion for the court recognizes that the actual conduct for 
which the officers were punished-dating and spending the night 
together-"is not self-evidently within the ambit of the regulations 
and thus does not carry with it its own warning of wrongdoing 
•
•
•
• "119 Judge Tate's opinion is admirably candid, and, as is 
characteristic of his work, he bends over backwards to emphasize 
the strengths of the losing side. That is good judging, if I may say 
so of a friend's work. But the net result in this case strikes me as 
perilously wrong. 
To punish police officers, whose records are otherwise spotless, 
for off-duty dating that they have no reason to believe is wrong 
and for love-making in private that they have been told is all right 
seems unjust-procedurally gross, if you will-in terms of elemen-
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 103. 
117. 701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 404 ( 1983) (Brennan, Marshall, 
and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting from the denial of cert.). 
118. Id. at 473. 
119. Id. at 478. 
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tary due process, which requires fair warning before discipline or 
discharge. Why should the Fifth Circuit go along with this? 
The answer lies in recognizing Shawgo v. Spradlin as the un­
fortunate and I think ill-advised, legacy of Bishop v. Wood,120 a 
five-to-fo�r opinion of the Supreme Court handed down in 1976. In 
Bishop a majority of the Court held that public employment per­
sonnel decisions, even mistaken ones, implicate no constitutionally 
protected liberty interest; absent a protected property state inter­
est, personnel decisions are outside the ken of federal judicial re­
view. Thus, in his peroration for the Court Justice Stevens says: 
The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review 
the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public 
agencies. We must accept the harsh fact that numerous individual 
mistakes are inevitable in the day-to-day administration of our af­
fairs. The United States Constitution cannot feasibly be construed 
to require federal judicial review for every such error. In the absence 
of any claim that the public employer was motivated by a desire to 
curtail or to penalize the exercise of an employee's constitutionally 
protected rights, we must presume that official action was regular 
and, if erroneous, can best be corrected in other ways. The Due Pro­
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against 
incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions.121 
Judge Tate quotes this passage in Shawgo; he also emphasizes that 
"the underlying conduct-cohabitation or romantic involvement 
between a subordinate and superior officer-was within the scope 
of state personnel regulations and not independeQtly protected by 
the Constitution,"121 a conclusion that is certainly suggested by 
Kelley v. Johnson.ua The right of privacy, particularly a police­
man's privacy, is  not unqualified. Most observers would agree with 
Judge Tate when he says there exists "a rational connection be­
tween the exigencies of Department discipline and forbidding 
members of a quasi-military unit, especially those different in 
rank, to share an apartment or to cohabit."12• But what about the 
claim of lack of warning? 
?n th is issue it is no answer to quote Bishop v. Wood. There 
the Court never reached the question of what proc ess is due, since 
l '.ll> ·1:.!t; l l S :14 1 1 1!176). 
1 2 1  Id a t  :14!1 . �>ll <f1•1lnoteo omitted ) .  
I ''" / I l l  F . :1cl Al 419. 
I :.!:I 4 'i�1 I 1 . S . 2:111, 244 4!1 ( 1 976). 
1 :14 /Ill F �d • l  411:1 
1983] Constitutional law 671 
neither "property" nor "liberty" interests, according to the Su­
preme Court, were at stake. However, in this Shawago case, the 
court acknowledged the presence of a constitutionally protected 
property interest under Texas civil service law, requiring cause for 
demotion, and demotion by due process: "The permanency of the 
personnel action and the substantial loss of benefits inherent in a 
demotion . . . support the employee's reasonable expectation of 
continued status unless cause exists for demotion; these factors 
create a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Pro­
cess clause."1211 Once constitutional entitlement enters a case, due 
process requires fair warning. To this observer, the catch-all regu­
lations as applied provided no warning at all. 
Of course police officers should not live together in sin, and 
chiefs of police should make that clear in their regulations. But it 
is quite another thing to approve off-duty dating and love making 
and then, without warning, to punish after the fact. Judge Tate, 
again with admirable candor, recognizes the unfairness of it all, 
and he repeatedly emphasizes the availability of state judicial 
review: 
The circumstances under which Whisenhunt was demoted may 
not seem 'fair' to us as judges, and we may hope that state judicial 
review affords a remedy for such unfairness as is perceived by us. 
Nevertheless, a federal court must heed the dictates of federalism 
that, where there is not an independently protected constitutional 
right, a federal .court is not 'the appropriate forum in which to re­
view the multitude of personne l  decisions that are made daily by 
public agencies.'126 
Judge Tate quotes Bishop u. Woo d 's peroration, to the effect that 
the United States Constitution is not a shield against incorrect 
Personnel decisions of state agencies. But, respectfully, the Due 
Process Clause has always been i nterpreted as a shield against pro­
cedural arbitrariness writ large, and nothing in Bishop u. Wood 
forecloses recognition that in public employment cases, where con­
stitutional entitlements are at stake, federal courts remain free 
to vouchsafe public employees against fundamentally unfair modes 
of governmental action. There are enough "cracks in the 'new 
Property' "-to use Professor Van Alstyne's felicitous 
125. Id. at 476. 
126. Id. at 478 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 349-50). 
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fi ure121_without the need for further federal court 
erosion of fed· 
e;al d ue process guarantees. State judicial review ma
y prove 
.
a f�lse 
hope. With great respect to the panel, Shawgo v. Spr
adlin 1s a 
hard case of missed opportunity. 
C. Taxpayer Due Process 
Daniel R. Rutherford,  pro se mind you, won his and Mrs. 
Rutherford's case128 against the Internal Reve nue Service during 
the term, and Judge Johnson's bold opinion for the court deserves 
a word of praise. The complaint sketched a portrait of palpably 
unfounded tax over-assessment, lawless vendetta, and mental har· 
assment on the part of an IRS agent by the name of Kuntz. The 
Rutherfords sought money damages for mental anguish, recovery 
of legal fees needlessly expended in fighting off the IRS, and puni· 
tive damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that 
available administrative procedure for recovery of tax over-assess· 
ments is sufficient due process. On appeal, the court reversed, in 
effect creating a Bivens-type129 tort action for taxpayer harass· 
ment. Characterizing the interests asserted as "an attempt to lay 
claim not to a property interest, but to a liberty interest derived 
from and protected by the substantive aspects of the due process 
clause,"130 Judge Johnson reasoned that the remedy suggested by 
the trial court is not responsive to the wrong stated in the com· 
127. Van Alsytne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the 
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 455, 487 (1977) wherein Pr fessor Van Alstyne 
argues that "liberty" as used in the due process clause shou'id be d fi d
o
to · I de freedom 
f b. d' d' · d 
e ne me u 
�om ar 1�rary a JU 1c�tlve proce ures or freedom from governmental adjudication of indi· 
v1dual .claims by 
unrel�able means. But 
_
see H�itian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 
(5th Cir. 1982), wherem the court, albeit findmg a minimal e ntitlement sufficient to invoke 
the guarantee of due p�ocess, was careful to point out that: 
the Supreme Court s current mode of analysis in proced I d f . . . ura ue process cases ore· closes recognition of a substantive entitlement to freedom f I . . rom governmenta proce-dural arb1trarmess . . . .  For now at least an individual h · 
· I f d d . 
' as no const1tutlona ree om from fun amentally unfair modes of governmental action th th 
· 
· 
· h Id · 
• e reatened depr1vat10n of wh1c wou trigger procedural due process protection 
Id. at 1037 n.30 (citation omitted). The Haitian Re'ug s. d' d 
· H 
· · I · 
' ' ee court struck down expe 1te processing of a1tJan asy um claims because "the governme t . . . 
gated the possibility that a Haitian's asylu h · 
n created cond1t1ons which ne· m earmg would be . f I . . . t' ing or nature." Id. at 1040. meaning u m either its 
1m· 
128. R�therford. v. United States, 701 F.2d 580
.
(5th Cir. 1983) 
129. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 38S 197 · . .  
cause of action for damages where federal narcotics agents 
� l) (recogmzmg a federal 
arrest of the petitioner without probable cause and in violat�
a e a warrantless search and 
130. 702 F.2d at 583. 
ion of the fourth amendment). 
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plaint. "In the language of procedural due process, it provides the 
Rutherfords no 'opportunity to be heard' on their allegations that 
Kuntz violated their constitutional rights."131 Because a refund 
proceeding is not the process that is due, the court reversed the 
trial court's decision that available judicial and administrative pro­
ceedings satisfy the fifth amendment's guarantee of due process. 
Curiously, the court in Rutherford left open the question 
whether the substantive aspects of the due process clause create in 
taxpayers a liberty interest in freedom from malicious harassment 
"of the kind, degree and effect"132 as that attributed to agent 
Kuntz. "Implication of nontextual substantive rights from the gen­
eral monitions of the due process clause is a matter not to be un­
dertaken lightly,"133 cautioned the court. Since the matter of sub­
stantive right had been neither briefed nor argued, it was left open 
for initial decision, by the district court. Judge Johnson's ap­
proach-deciding on what process is due while at the same time 
pretermitting the question of substantive right-is contrary to the 
analysis suggested in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth 
and its offspring. 134 The usual approach is to determine, first, 
whether liberty or property ·interests are at stake, and only then to 
consider what process is due. Coming at these questions in reverse 
order leaves the reader, not to mention Mr. and Mrs. Rutherford, 
hanging. What appears a signal victory for the harassed taxpayer 
may prove, on remand, an empty dictum. We shall see. 
D. Regulating Doctors 
The court in Maceluch v. Wysongm perceived a rational basis 
for legislative differentiation between doctors of medicine and doc­
tors of osteopathy. The latter emphasize manipulative therapy 
rather than the use of surgery or drugs in health care. The court 
reasoned that two schools of medicine, even if they differ only in 
their advocacy of differing philosophical approaches to the same 
sc.ientific realities, "present a difference that a legislature may note 
Without unlawfully discriminating against one, or preferring one 
131. Id. at 584. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
W 134. 408 U.S. 564 (1971). See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Bishop v . 00d, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). Accord Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
135. 680 F.2d 1062 (5th Cir.1982). 
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over the other. "136 Hence there was nothing unconsti tutional about 
requiring doctors of osteopathy to uti l_ize the
. 
designati�m "D.O." 
rather than the familiar " M. D. "  following their names m connec· 
tion with professional practice. Con trol l ing the designation under 
which physicians may practice is a form of economic regulation, 
said the court; furthermore, "the 'right' to be admitted to a profes· 
sion, including medicine, is not fundamen tal per se in the constitu · 
tional sense. "137 Absent constitutionally protected interests, Judge 
Higginbotham is surely wise to eschew the role of super-medical 
board in the guise of judicial review: 
A federal court decree is clean, swift, and d i fficult  to overturn. Its 
powers attract those who have lost in the rough and tumble of legis­
lative politics, but its power is undemocratic and antimajoritarian. 
Accordingly, the rationale for the exercise of judicial power requires, 
at the least, that the 'constitutional' interest impi nged by the legis­
lature be one traceable to the Constitution.  The Court has no veto. 
That belongs to the governor. And saying it is the Constitu tion that 
vetoes does not make it so.138 
E. Removal of Clinical Privileges 
Tenured medical school professors generally practice what 
they profess, usually by way of clinical privi leges. Daly v. 
Sprague.139 l�aves in doubt whether these p rivileges rise to the level of const1tut1onally protected "property" i n  the Roth sense of the 
word, viz., "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person 
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He 
must have more. �han a unilateral expectation of it. He must, 
in· 
ste�d, h�':e a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."uo Justice Stew­
art s op1mon for the C ourt in Roth goes o n  to say that, 
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. 
Rather, they are created and their dimensi·on d fi d b 
· · 1 d . 
s are e ne y ex-
1stmg ru es or un erstandmgs that stem from 
- d d 
h 
an 1n epen ent source 
sue as state law-rules or understandings th t 
· b d . 
a secure certam ene-fits an that support claims of entitlement t th b fi u1 
136. Id. at 1066. 
137. Id. at 1065. 
138. Id. at 1069-70. 
o ose ene ts. 
139. 675 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 103 s C 140. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
' 
· t. 1448 (1983). 
141.  Id. 
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Regardless of what one thinks of Justice Stewart's idea that 
property interests are not created by the Constitution, which some 
commentators think a dubious proposition, 142 certainly the Fifth 
Circuit is obliged to follow the law-however well or poorly the 
Supreme Court declares it. Thus, the Fifth Circuit has said "we 
look to state law for the existence of a property interest."143 Judge 
Randall's opinion for the court in Daly v. Sprague is exemplary 
not only i n  terms of carefully following the law, but also in terms 
of forcefully laying it out. There is something powerful and inexo­
rable about Carolyn Randall's opinions for the court. Daly is a fine 
example of no-nonsense writing in the reports. Substantively, the 
court acknowledges that possession of medical staff privileges may 
constitute a property interest protected against arbitrary depriva­
tion. But the record in Daly-note well ye lawyers-was too sparse 
to satisfy plaintiff's burden of showing constitutional entitlement. 
The record was barren of facts showing that Daly's clinical privi­
leges were analogous to medical staff privileges, or that there was 
any explicit written or oral agreement which created an entitle­
ment to these privileges. "We do not intimate that clinical privi­
leges could not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected 
property interest; we only say that, in this case, Daly did not meet 
his burden of presenting facts t o  show that a property interest ex­
isted."1" Thus, Daly is a case that turns on a failure of proof. Al­
though in fairness to the licked lawyer, not to mention future cli­
ents, one wonders what kind of proof would satisfy Judge Randall. 
Likewise Dr. Daly did not demonstrate the existence of a lib­
erty interest by his claim that removal of clinical privileges dam­
aged his reputation. There was no "stigma-plus" as is required 
Under both the Supreme Court's opinion in Paul v. Davis10 and 
the Fifth Circuit's holding in Moore v. Otero. 146 Dr. Daly retained 
his professorship throughout the incident in question, and he suf­
fered no " drastic change in status "  by reason of the temporary re­
moval of clinical privileges after he indicated he would be unavail­
able due to his wife's illness. 147 On his return from voluntary leave, 
his clinical privileges were quickly restored. "Any alleged damage 
142. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty " and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 434-39 (1977). 
143. 675 F.2d at 727 (citing Moore v. Otero, 557 F.2d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 1977)). 
144. 675 F.2d at 727. 
145. 424 U.S. 693, 700-1 1  (1976). 
146. 557 F.2d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 1977). 
147. 675 F.2d at 728. 
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to reputation because Daly could not see patients or because he 
would be forced to reveal the temporary loss of privileges does not 
implicate a liberty interest,"148 the court reasoned. All was not lost, 
however as Judge Randall reversed the trial court for its unex­
plained 
1
failure to consider plaintiff's first amendment claim. Dr. 
Daly also alleged that defendant Sprague forbade him from com­
municating with his patients, and that, as a result, he was unable 
to participate in a consultation with another p hysician. These alle­
gations, the court ruled, "raise first amendment concerns which are 
not dependent upon the existence of a liberty or property inter­
est."1411 Summary judgment for failure to state a claim was there­
fore improper as to Daly's first amendment allegations, and the 
court remanded the matter for supplemental briefing and discov­
ery, if necessary, and for the trier's consideration on the merits of 
Daly's first amendment claim. 
IV. SC07T v. MOORE1w 
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 
Here is the term's most spectacular case: en bane, one of the 
Old Fifth's last; a divided court on a perplexing question of law 
and history; two principal opinions, one by Judge Charles Clark for 
fourteen members of the court, now the law of the Circuit from the 
pen of its new Chief; a dissent for eight judges authored jointly by 
Judges Rubin and Williams, scholars both; and separate dissenting 
opinions by Judges Anderson and Garwood. At first glance, the 
facts of the case suggest nothing more than mob violence against 
nonunion construction workers along Alligator Bayou near Port 
A�th�r ,  Te�as. This is not meant to excuse the busting of heads 
w1�h t�on pipe, only to ask what this assault and battery case is 
?omg m f �deral court. The late Mr. Justice Harlan once put a sim­
ilar question to then Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall during 
the oral argument of United States v. Guest:11n "Could the Con­
gress make the murdering of a Negro a federal crime?"1�2 Solicitor 
l ·IK.  Id 
1 ·l�I I cl . 
l '.� l . llHO F . "d !17!1 1 :1th (' ir . 1 911:.!) ( e n  bane). 
I '.> I :11<:1 I !  S. 7.1:1 1 l !Hili ) .  
1 :.�� Th•· ' 1 1 1"1 "' inri ;, from the Kound record' f th , , .. 1 · I · . ing o e argument, No 65, Oct. ferm l . H  .. ., '"'"' :-i l n l ••• '" < . 111•• t .  AfKllrd Nov 9 1 96� Th h 
· 
I 
I . . 
· • · · e aut or uses excerpts from the actua "r" n r � 1 1 1n r n l •  111 thr ""'"'' l'R'<'. mrludina M I t' H I , . . · 
.. r. • us ice ar an s question, m teaching con-
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General Marshall said no, based on his understanding of control­
ling law. But a lot of law, not to mention legal history, has gone 
over the damn since then, beginning with the Guestu3 case itself in 
1966. At bottom, what is ultimately at stake in Scott v. Moore is 
nothing less than the proper allocation of judicial authority be­
tween the courts of the Union and the courts of the States. 
In barest outline, the essentials are these: First, the Recon­
struction Congress that passed the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, in­
cluding section 2 of the original act, 154 was pretty plainly worried 
about massive, military-like political terrorism on the part of the 
rogues in white sheets in the postbellum South. Negroes were mur­
dered not because. they were black, but because they were Republi­
cans-a point that has been lost to history. m The ultimate goal of 
stitutional law at the LSU Law School. For further details, see Baier, What Is the Use of a 
Law Book Without Pictures or Conversations?, 34 J. LEGAL Eouc. __ (1984) 
(forthcoming). 
153. 383 U.S. 745 (1966), of which Professor Alfred Avins has said: " [T]he United 
States Supreme Court has turned history inside out. . . .  (T]he Guest case is so wide of the 
mark that it would be necessary to burn all of the Congressional Globes in the nation to 
support it." Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State Action 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Loms U.L.J. 331, 381 (1967). See generally Kelly, 
Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1 19. 
154. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. V 1981). 
155. Common citizens, too, were the object of Klan violence when they supported the 
Republicans-thus, both whites and blacks who voted Republican were visited by 
Klansmen; contrariwise, voters of both races were left alone when they supported Demo­
crats. It was not therefore race but party affiliation that singled a voter out for Klan atten­
tion. To prove this "political" motive for Klan terrorism, Congressman Stoughton (R. 
Mich.) quoted the testimony of James Boyd, a confederate veteran and Klansman, before 
the Joint Ku Klux Klan Investigating Committee of 1871: 
Question. What is your knowledge of the object and extent of this organization 
[the White Brotherhood] throughout the State [North Carolina]? 
Answer. Their object was the overthrow of the reconstruction policy of Congress and 
the disfranchisement of the negro. 
Question. Were there any whippings in the county? 
Answer. Yes, sir. I believe there were one hundred or one hundred and fifty in the 
last two years in the county, white and black. 
CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 320 (Mar. 28, 1871) (emphasis added). Representative 
Stoughton also quoted from the testimony of freedman Caswell Holt, "who was twice visited 
by the Ku Klux." Speaking of blacks in his county, Holt stated that: 
[The Ku Klux Klan] wanted to run them all off because the principal part of them 
voted the Radical [Republican] ticket . . . . Question. Were those that would not vote 
the Conservative [Democratic] ticket the ones that had these outrages committed on 
them?Answer. Yes, sir. You never saw one bothered at all that voted the Conserva­
tive ticket. 
Co1w. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 321 (Mar. 28, 1871). Congressman Buckley (R. Ala.) sup­
Ported the observation of Boyd, Holt, and others that racial oppression was not the primary 
animus or object of the Klan-its true motive being a desire to wrest and keep control of 
State governments from the Republicans, thereby subverting Congressional Reconstruction: 
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the Klan, the Republicans believed,. wa
s usurpation, through terror 
and political subversion, of Repu�hcan c?ntrol of �outher� states, 
thereby overthrowing Reconstruction pohcy and w1thdrawmg from 
the freedmen the equal protection of laws and the equal privileges 
and immunities that the Reconstruction Amendments to the Con­
stitution were meant to secure. 1116 The Forty-Second Congress, like 
Congresses ever since, was divided on what to do. The Radical 
Republicans had some far reaching ideas that you can read about, 
either originally in the Congressional Globe, or second-hand in the 
University of Chicago Law Review. m Representative Shanks (R­
ind.) asserted in debate that the federal government possessed the 
authority "to go down into the several States to protect [United 
States] citizens" in the enjoyment of their natural rights. Later 
Shanks declared, "I do not want to see [the original bill] so 
What is the philosophy of Kukluxism? In what does it take its origin? It does not 
originate in Republican misrule . . . .  Nor does this Ku Klux business take its origin 
in the antagonisms of race. White and black suffer alike; more colored than white, 
because the colored are the most numerous. 
Id., app. at 194. 
The observations contained in these primary sources are corroborated and confirmed by 
Harold M. Hyman and William M. Wiecek in their recent book EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 301 ( 1982): "But concerns about civil rights, 
even in their Reconstruction context, were never wholly race-centered: they included wide 
and growing attention to the condition of white Unionists and bluecoats. Northerners, espe· 
cially Republicans, were accustomed to blending these commitments." 
156. The purpose of the Klan violence and intimidation was to subvert and replace 
the Republican State governments with Democratic regimes sympathetic to a return to the 
status quo ante bellum, to a restoration of the Bourbon hegemony. The remarks of Con· 
gressman Wilson (R. Ind.) are typical of the Republicans' perceptions: "And, sir, what is the 
purpose of all this bloody work? . . .  [l]t is for the express purpose of controlling govern· 
ment in the States where these things are done, by preventing citizens from exercising their 
legitimate constitutional privileges." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., !st Sess. 484 (Apr. 5, 1871). 
For corroboration of the Republicans' view by modern historians, see D. CHALMERS, 
HOODED AMERICANISM: THE HISTORY OP THE Ku KLUX KLAN 1 1, 14 ( 1981); and A. 
TREALEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE Ku KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUC­
TION pt. VI, at 383-98 (1971). 
157. Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46 
U. �HI. L. REV . 402 (1979). Professor Alfred Avins also recounts the legislative history in his 
article The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State Action and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST Louis U L J 329 (1967) Th t' 1 't d · both the 
. . 
. 
· 
· · · 
. ese ar 1c es are c1 e m maionty and the dissenting opinions. Judges Rubin and Williams refer to B. SCHWARTZ, ST
d
ATUTORY .Hu1iT
d
O�Y OP 
.THE UNITED STATES (1970), and to several other law review articles an notes, inc u mg Wildman 42 U S C  § 1985(3' A p, · · · 
t h A d 
. ' · · · 1 - wate Action to Vindicate Four· 
eent men ment Rights: A Paradox Resolved, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 317 (1980); Com· ment, Prwate Consp1rac1e.s to Violate Civil Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 721 (19n)· Note, The ;;o
t
u�e�
t
WatMns of S�ctwn 1985(3) Litigation, 1973 LAw & Soc. Oao. 639. I� is obvious a · co 11. oore stimulated the court's 8 h 1 1 bT (not counting headnotes) and 90 footnotes. 
c 0 ar Y a 1 1ties; the opinions total 44 pages 
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amended that there shall be taken out of it the frank assertion of 
the p ower o f  the national Government to protect life, liberty, and 
pro perty, irrespective of the act of the State."168 But this view, and 
with it the original version of Section 2 of the Ku Klux Act, was 
rejected on grounds that Congress did not have the power to feder­
alize tort law. In the words of Congressman John A. Bingham, 
chief author of the fourteenth a mendment: "God forbid . . . that 
by so legislating we would strike down the rights of the State. . . . 
I believe our dual system of g overnment essential to our national 
existence."169 One thing stands out from the debates: As finally 
passed, the Ku Klux Act was aimed at affording protection to 
United States citizens in the Sou th within the contours of the fed­
eral system the Republicans wanted to preserve-one with "a clear 
and well defined line between the powers of the G eneral Govern­
ment and the powers of the States. m6o Looking back over the his­
tory of our constitutional law, it's fair to say the line has remained 
neither clear nor well-defined. 
At this point I had better confess that I am no historian. Like 
most judges I take my history from the law reviews and from those 
more qualified than I to divine legislative p urpose from the dusty 
pages of the Congressional Globe. But we all are obliged to do the 
best we can.161 Scott  v. Moore, as we shall see in a moment, con­
fronts us with two versions of history; in doing s o  it raises the 
thorny problem of objectivity and reconstruction in history, a mat­
ter that has justifiably worried both scholars and practitioners 
alike.1112 
. One historical exegesis, not cited by either the majority or the 
dissent in Scott  v. Moore-this time from a professional historian 
�
.
solid reputation in the field of Reconstruction history, Professor 
ichael Les Benedict-pretty well sums u p  the congressional 
Inood that gave us the Ku Klux Klan Act as best I can fathom it: 
158 CONG.. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 141 (Apr. 3, 1871). 
159. Id. app. at 84 (Mar. 31, 1871). 
160. Id. at 187 (Rep. Chas. Willard, R. Vt.) (Apr. 6, 1871). 
in th161. Most law schools, including the better ones, make no effort to train their students 
th e techniques of historical scholarship. What counts most is current caselaw, never mind 
irJ Past. Even the leading treatises in constitutional law are lamentably bereft of historical 
Co or�ation and background. Of course this is all wrong. See generally Scheiber, American 
6S 7titutional History and the New Legal History: Complimentary Themes in Two Modes, 
. A>.t. HIST. 337, 349 (1981). 
F' w162. See generally c. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969); 
�ct IE�t;:R, USES AND ABUSES OF LEGAL HISTORY: A PRACTITIONER'S VIEW (1962) (Selden Soc. Ure). 
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As to the permanent protection for Americans' rights,  despite argu­
ments to the contrary by those modern legal scholars who write in 
the tradition of a new nationalism, all the evidence of the congres­
sional discussions, the ratification debates, and the public contro­
versy indicates that Republicans intended the States to retain pri­
mary jurisdiction over citizen's rights.188 
Thus a limiting amendment was added to the Act as originally pro­
posed, substituting the language now found in section 1985(3), pro­
scribing conspiracies with "the purpose of depriving any persons 
or class of person, directly or indirectly, of the equal protection of 
the laws, or equal privileges and immunities under the laws." It is 
not self-evident just what this means. 
Enough legislative history. Like all statutes, section 1985(3) 
must be interpreted and applied not only to the problems of the 
past, but to the problems of the present, and to those of the future. 
Doubtless history should play a part in determining the meaning 
of either a federal statute or the United States Constitution. 
Surely Cardozo was right in saying: " [H]istory, in illuminating the 
past, illuminates the present, and in illuminating the present, il­
luminates the future."184 But there are occasions when courts de­
cline to follow history in determining present law, and thereby the 
law of the future. In Dean Pound's famous expression: "Law must 
be stable and yet it cannot stand still."1611 Thus there is in this 
Alligator Bayou case another ultimate concern, not of political sov­
ereignty, but of the interrelationship between law and history. 
Enter the courts. The year is 1971, the centennarie of the Klan 
Act; the case is Griffin v. Breckenridge,166 on certiorari from the 
Fifth Circuit; at issue are questions going to the scope and consti­
tutionality of 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3). Justice Stewart begins by 
paying tribute to Judge Irving Goldberg's opinion for the Fifth 
Circuit below, which expressed "serious doubts" as to the "contin­
ued vita l ity" of Collins v. Hardyman,167 which read a state action 
e!ement int� section.}985(3) . Speaking for the Fifth Circuit, Judge 
( ,oJdherg sa�d that it would not surprise us if Collins v. Hardy­
man were d isapproved and if § 1985(3) were held to embrace pri-
l fi:I. Bf'nrdicl, l'rf'�ervi1111 Federali.•m: Reconstruction and th W · C 9 8 S < 'T. fh:v. :19, 48. e aite ourt, 1 7 UP. 
l f14 .  B. C'A Knozo, •upra note I ,  al 53. 
1 1;r, .  H. 1'011N11, INTr.RPRF.TATIONs OP LEGAL H1sTORv 1 (1923) l tili .  40:1 t l .S. 811 ( 197 1 ) .  .
l fii. :14 1 t l .S. 115 1 ( 1951 ) .  
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vate conspiracies to interfere with rights of national citizenship,"168 
but he concluded that " [s)ince we may not adopt what the Su­
preme Court has expressly rejected, we obediently abide the man­
date in Collins."169 Here again is judging in the grand manner. 
What a joy to be reversed by the Supreme Court-sometimes. 
Griffin v. Breckenridge rejects the artificially restrictive con­
struction of Collins, saying that "in the light of the evolution of 
decisional law in the years that have passed since that case was 
decided . . . many of the constitutional problems there perceived 
simply do not exist. Little reason remains, therefore, not to accord 
to the words of the statute their apparent meaning."110 Plainly, 
there is no state action element in the words of the statute, and 
Griffin construes it to cover private conspiracies. But not all tor­
tious conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others are 
covered. 
The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting § 
1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full 
effect to the congressional purpose-by requiring, as an element of 
the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motiva­
tion stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment. 171 
At this point Justice Stewart emphasized the language quoted 
above requiring intent to deprive persons or classes of persons of 
equal protection of the laws, or equal privileges and immunities 
under laws. " [T]here must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise 
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspir­
ators' action,"172 said Justice Stewart for the Court. This latter 
statement, as best I can make out, is a quantum jump away from 
the original purpose of the Ku Klux Klan Act, viz.,  political sub­
version.178 But remember a century has intervened; original pur­
pose may have little to do with present problems. The Klan in 
168. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817, 825-26, (5th Cir. 1969). 
169. Id. at 826-27. 
170. 403 U.S. at 95-96. 
171 . Id. at 102. 
172. Id. 
173. There is a marked tendency for the modern mind, looking backwards, to see its 
own day and age, and its own problems, reflected in the past, rather than to see the past for 
What it really was. This tendency-historians call it the "fallacy of presentism"-doubtless 
Produces other, lesser slips, such as dating the Congressional Globe 1971 instead of 1871, as 
it mistakenly appears in both the en bane majority slip opinion and in the published report 
of Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d at 721 (panel opinion); 680 F.2d at 993 (en bane majority opin­
ion). This blunder escaped the notice of 24 Fifth Circuit judges, 72 law clerks (each judge 
has three), and the sharp eyes at West Publishing Co. 
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1971 is a different animal, out to bust black skulls for different 
reasons. Racism has replaced politics in the scheming of the Klan. 
The complaint in Griffin r ecited a scenario typical of the In­
visible Empire at its worst: A bunch of whites mistook blacks 
travelling on state and federal highways in Mississippi for civil 
rights workers; blocked their way; dragged them out of their car; 
and beat them over the head with clubs. Justice Stewart for a 
unanimous Supreme Court understandably had little tolerance for 
this kind of conduct. "Indeed, the conduct here alleged lies so close 
to the core of the coverage intended by Congress that it is hard to 
conceive of wholly private conduct that would come within the 
statute if this does not."174 Query, what about a conspiracy aimed 
at busting nonunion hardhats along the banks of Alligator Bayou? 
How far out from the core is it permissible to draw analogies? And 
what of the penumbra? You can see where we're going. 
In Griffin the Court was quick to throw the mantle of the stat­
ute's federal protection over " Negro citizens who have been the 
victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action 
aimed at depriving them of the basic rights that the law secures to 
all free men."17G This was authorized by the thirteenth amendment 
and its enforcement clause, said Justice Stewart. Furthermore, 
plaintiffs were exercising their right of interstate travel, one of 
those basic rights protected by the Constitution even as against 
private deprivation. It was clear to Justice Stewart that plaintiffs 
"had suffered from conduct that Congress may reach under its 
power to p rotect the right of interstate travel."178 Justice Stewart 
wound up his reversing opinion in the accustomed fashion: "The 
judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for 
further �roceedings consistent with this opinion. "177 This brings 
us, full c ircle, back to the Fifth Circuit. 
. We re�ch ��ott u: ��9ore proper. Judge Clark's majority opin­ion, a�rmmg. mJunct1ve �nd monetary relief against the defen­
dants .. mcludmg �evera_l unions, is built upon two major premises: 
( 1 )  private , conspiratorial abridgment of first amendment freedoms 
-- ·-- ----------------
174 .  ·IO:I \ J .S. al 10:1. 
1 7f>. Id. al IOfJ. 
1 71i. Id. nl 1 06.  
1 77 .  Id .  nl 1 07 .  
1 7H. Wh .. thN the Norrie l.a(;uerdia Act, 29 U.S C §§ 104 10
.
5 ( l9? · · · 1 · f h · 
· 
· 
- 6) precludes 1nJunc-t1vr rr 1t· on I .. fnrts prr•eotrd '" heyond the scope of this article. 
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is a denial of equal protection of the laws within the meaning of 
section 1985(3) as interpreted in Griffin; and (2) C ongress intended 
the statute to reach not only racially motivated class-based denials 
of equal protection, but other similar kinds of class-based "invidi­
ous discrimination" as well. This latter idea follows the reasoning 
of the Fifth C ircuit, again sitting en bane, in Kimble v. McDuffy,11• 
decided in 1981, ten years after Griffin. In Kimble the court con­
sidered what other kinds of class-based animus section 1985(3) 
might reach, and concluded two types of classes come within the 
statute's coverage. First, the statute covers classes " having com­
mon characteristics of an inherent nature"-viz.,  those kinds of 
classes offered special protection under the equal protection 
clause.180 The Fifth Circuit also recognized that: 
The class-based animus required by the Supreme Court in Griffin 
and now reasserted by this court is not identical with the class­
based distinctions required to support an action under the equal 
protection clause. . . . For example, section 1985 was certainly in­
tended to cover conspiracies against Republicans; distinctions based 
on affiliation with a major political party are not among those tradi­
tionally subject to special scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. What Griffin stands for, and what we now hold, is that Sec­
tion 1985 was intended to encompass only those conspiracies 
motivated by animus against the kinds of classes Congress was try­
ing to protect when it enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act.181 
The essential minor premise in Scott v. Moore, of course, is that 
the nonunion construction workers who were injured in the case,  
although not the usual "discreet and insular minorities"182 pro­
tected by the equal protection clause, are "the kind[ ] of class[ ] 
Congress was trying to protect when it enacted the Ku Klux Klan 
Act."183 You can see how a statute, once it is cut loose from its 
historical moorings, is not easily cabined. 
The majority in Scott v. Moore refuses to follow the law of the 
Fourth and Seventh Circuits to the effect that section 1985(3) pro­
vides no remedy for purely private impairment of first amendment 
speech and associational freedoms. m These holdings, according to 
179. 648 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane). 
180. Id. at 347. 
181. Id. at 347 n.9. 
182. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4. (1938). 
183. Kimble v. McDuffy, 648 F.2d at 347 n.9. 
184. Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974); Murphy v. Mount Car­
mel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976). 
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Judge Clark, are inconsistent with the S upreme Court's reasoning 
in Griffin and "so long as Griffin rema i n s  viable, we are bound by 
its determination that section 1985(3) reaches all deprivations of 
equal protection, whatever their source. "
1 86 The difficulty with 
Judge Clark's analysis is that the first amendment, even as trans­
mogrified by incorporation into a fourteenth amendment right,m 
has always been viewed as a restriction against government, not 
private individuals. C onstitutio
nal law is  confus i ng enough without 
the notion of a first amendment violation of the equal protection 
clause by private conspiracy. Although sect ion 1 985(:3) plainly 
reaches both public and private conspiracies aimed at denying per­
sons equal protection of the laws, "it is a non sequitur to conclude 
that it, therefore, reaches all constitutional v iolations. " 1 8
7 
Contrary to what is said in the majority op in ion, the determi· 
nation whether a conspiracy is aimed at depriving "any person or 
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal 
privileges and immunities under the laws" 1 88-which is the Ian· 
guage of the limiting amendment-does not have as a component 
"the violation of some protected right. "189 Justice Stewart's opin· 
ion for the Court in Griffin carefully separates the determination 
of invidiously discriminatory animus-the second element of a sec· 
tion 1985(3) claim-and the determination whether the conspiracy 
deprived another "of having and exercising any right or privilege of 
a citizen of the United States"-the fourth element of the cause of 
action. 190 Subsequent t o  Griffin the Supreme Court has made it 
clear that sec�ion 1985(3) "provides no substantive rights itself; it 
merely provides a remedy for violation of the rights it 
d
_
e�ignat�s."19
1 Those des�gnated rights are the rig hts of national 
citizenship, as Judge Irvmg Goldberg correctly recognized when 
Griffin _v. Breckenridge was first before the Fifth C ircuit in 1969; 
and �hile t�� _first amen�i:nent, including freedom of association, is certamly a right or privilege of a citizen o f  th u "t d St tes " 
th. . al . h 1 
e m e a , 
is nation rig t on y shields the people ag 
· t t not ams governmen , 
185. 680 F.2d at 990. 
186. See Near v. Minnesota 283 U S 697 707 (193 ) 
longer open to doubt that the liberty f · · 
' 
1 (per Hughes, C.J.) ("It is no 
0 press, and of speech · "th· h l"b t afe guarded from invasion by state action ") - G'tl 
• ts w1 m t e 1 er Y s · 
(dictum) . 
· 
' 1 ow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 ( 1925) 
187. Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d at 1012 (Rubin and 
· 
· 
188. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Wilhams, JJ., dissenting). 
189. 680 F.2d at 988. 
190. See 403 U.S. at 102-03 for an especially pertine . . 191. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v N t 
nt discussion. . ovo ny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 ( 1979). 
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their neighbors. As Judges Rubin and Williams recognize in their 
dissent-correctly, it is submitted: "The extension of § 1985(3) to 
protect against private infringement of every right protected 
against governmental action b y  the Constitution would create a 
Bivens-type tort action against every private cons piracy that af­
fects a federal constitutional right."192 With all respect, the major­
ity in Scott v. Moore interprets section 1985(3) to create substan­
tive rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the 
laws, an approach the Supreme C ourt has expressly rejected in the 
parallel field of constitutional interpretation. "It is not the prov­
ince of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the 
name of guaranteeing equal p rotection of the laws,"193 the Su­
preme Court has said. By parity of reasoning, it is likewise not the 
function of the Fifth Circuit to create substantive statutory rights 
in the name of guaranteeing equal protection, or to overrule the 
Civil Rights Casesm by statutory reconstruction. 
The majority's minor premise-that nonunion construction 
workers are the kind of class Congress was trying to protect when 
it passed the Ku Klux Klan Act in 187 1-also seems strained. Cer­
tainly Congress could not have specifically intended to protect 
nonunion workers; the labor movement in America was yet to be 
born. The purpose of the Klan Act was protection of Republicans 
against political repression, not labor violence. By way of response, 
the majority resorts to reasoning by analogy. We are told: (1) "an 
animus directed against nonunion association is closely akin to ani­
mus directed against political association"; and (2) "the position of 
these nonunion employees in Jefferson County, Texas, is markedly 
similar to that of the Republicans in the South."1911 It is precisely 
at this point that the majority and the dissent part company. Says 
the dissent: "Congress in 1871 was assuredly not trying the protect 
192. 680 F.2d at 1014. 
193. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). 
194. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Compare Mr. Justice Jackson's comment, dissenting in United 
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 635 (1954): "Judicial construction, constitutional or statu­
tory, is always subject to hazards of judicial reconstruction." Compare Frankfurter, J., con­
curring in Graves v. N.Y. ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939), wherein note is taken 
of the occasional tendency on the part of judges "to encrust unwarranted interpretations 
upon the Constitution and thereafter to consider merely what has been judicially said about 
the Constitution, rather than to be primarily controlled by a fair conception of the Constitu­
tion." The same thing, of course, can be said of statutory construction, and the judicial 
history of section 1985(3)-from Griffin u. Breckenridge on down-is a striking illustration 
of this encrustation phenomenon. 
195. 680 F.2d at 994. 
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non-union workers, not only because it would 
not then have recog­
nized the difference between union members an
d non-union mem­
bers but simply because the Klan posed no thr
eat to such work­
ers."186 What the majority forgets, and the d issent
 notes only 
slightly, is that as soon as the Klan spread from Tennessee in the 
spring of 1868, "the Ku Klux conspiracy no longer lay within the 
power of most states to control. "197 It was this state powerlessness 
that prompted extension of federal protection in the first place.
10s 
Nothing suggests that the sovereign state of Texas, with its crimi­
nal and civil courts, was powerless to bring the violence at Alliga­
tor Bayou under control, or to provide adequate relief to its vic­
tims. With all respect to the court, the majority's failure to take 
into account the availability of state relief is faithless to the Klan 
Act's original history, if not its literal text, and unjustifiably ex­
tends federal judicial power beyond its legitimate borders.199 
Judges Rubin and Williams would apply "a purely historical 
test"200 in interpreting the Klan Act. On the other side of the 
fence, Judge Clark instructs us that "the protection afforded by 
the civil rights acts is not static."201 The dissent reads the law nar­
rowly, tying it to the past. Judge Clark construes the statute with 
the breadth of a constitution, bequeathing it to the future.202 Per­
haps there is no right or wrong here, only sides to choose. Some 
judges prefer to follow history. Other judges, equally faithfully to 
196. 680 F.2d at 1017 (Rubin and Williams, JJ., dissenting). 
197. A. TRELEASE, supra note 156, at 383. 
198. By early 1871 the crisis for the Republican Reconstruction governments of the 
So�th �ad become so pronounced that President Grant himself requested the passage of 
leg1slat1on aimed at stabilizing the South, for state authorities were themselves powerless to 
act: "[T)he power to correct these evils is beyond the control of the State authorities . . . .  "
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (Mar. 23, 1871). 
See also the remarks of Congressman Cook (R.-111.) defending "the right of the United 
States to interfere and protect the citizen in person and property, when, by unlawful combi­
nauo.na too strong for the State authorities to put down or subdue, the citizen is deprived of h1a nghta." Id. at 485 (Apr. 5, 1871) .  
l99. For Harold Hyman's evidence and argument that after the Civil War, Northern 
R�pu��icane progressively returned to their antebellum philosophy of "state-centered feder· 
aham, aee H. HYMAN A MORE PERF U · T ' ECT NION. HE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECON-
HTRllC:TION ON THE CONSTITUTION 433-45 ( 1 973) S [ H H 
I . U l 
· ee a so . YMAN & W. W1ECEK, EQUAL 
·. �
;��
I.IC �DER ::;: ;0�STITUTl?NAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 465 (1982) (describing the 
R a11 a pern o s yrocketmg respect for state rights") '.lOO. 61!0 F.2d at 1016. 
. 
W I .  Id. at 992. 
'.lO:l. Hut compare Mr . .  Justice Jackson's . . 
.IMnnf'lle, :1 1 9  U.S. lfi7, 1 8 1  0943)· "Thie 
ap�r�u, concum�g m the result, in Douglas v. 
nf rnnatitutionAI law and th t ' ' 1  h 
Court 18 forever addmg new stories to the temples 
added. "  
' e emp es ave 8 way of collapsing when one story too many is 
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their oaths, look to the future. Griffin v. Breckenridge itself cut the 
Klan Act loose from history.203 Judge Clark and the majority in 
Scott v. Moore continue the voyage. Should the law follow history, 
or make it? There is no one answer. 
And what of the statute as construed by the majority? Can 
Congress reach out this far? The majority says yes, pegging its con­
struction on the commerce clause, and citing such familiar prece­
dents as United States v. Darby,204 Wickard v. Filburn,20" and 
Katzenbach v. McClung.206 There was evidence of goods purchased 
outside Texas; that was enough commerce among the states to sat­
isfy the majority. Judge Clark quotes Chief Justice Marshall's im­
mortal utterance in McCulloch v. Maryland: "Let the end be legit­
imate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means 
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of 
the constitution, are constitutional."207 Applying these standards, 
the majority concludes Congress acted within its constitutional 
power "when it enacted section 1985(3) to reach the private con­
spiracy involved here."208 This assumes, of course, that Congress 
was thinking about interstate commerce when it passed the Klu 
Klux Klan Act in 1871, a dubious proposition at best. As a matter 
of demonstrable historical record, the Forty-Second Congress had 
no such thing in mind. The dissenting judges make this clear, and 
Judge Garwood's response to the majority's reliance on McCulloch 
v. Maryland is devastating: "It stands McCulloch v. Maryland on 
its head to say that an 'end' not intended by Congress, and which 
Congress was not required to intend, can be used to sustain, and in 
sustaining to transform, an act of Congress taken in the exercise of 
distinctly different constitutional powers. "209 In the old Myers case 
in the Supreme Court, Senator George Wharton Pepper told the 
203. So did Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See generally Casper, 
Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 89; Gerber, Playing 
Tricks on the Dead: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, An Historical Inquiry, 1 PACE L. 
REv. 59 (1980). Professor Louis Henkin has charged that the Jones Court was "carried away 
by opportunity and temptation to do also Congress' share and to give the country statutes 
which no Congress ever enacted." Henkin, The Supreme Court 1967 Term-Foreword: On 
Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 83 (1968). 
204. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
205. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
206. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
207. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
208. 680 F.2d at 998. 
209. 680 F.2d at 1025 (Garwood, J., dissenting). 
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Court: "I appeal to the [historical] reco�d, beca�se when th�s gr�at 
tribunal declares the law we all bow to it; but history remams his­
tory, in spite of judicial utterances upon the subj ect."210 
The philosopher Sidney Hook has written: 
There is a difference between using our knowledge of the history of 
the past in order to influence the future, to ?elp bring ab?ut events 
we regard desirable and to forestall those which are und_es1rable, and 
making or manufacturing a history of the past solely with an eye to 
achieve our aims. m 
Scott v. Moore, if not bad statutory construction, is bad constitu­
tional law because it rests upon-say it softly-fiction. 
Editor's Addendum 
On July 5, 1983, after Professor Baier's analysis of Scott v. 
Moore was submitted to the Review, the United States Supreme 
Court, in a five-to-four decision, reversed the en bane decision of 
the Fifth Circuit. In United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Scott,212 
the Court c onfirmed the view that, even in a section 1985(3) con­
text, state involvement is still required to violate first amendment 
rights.218 The Court recognized that section 1985(3) d oes not create 
substantive statutory rights and that nonunion construction work­
ers are not the kind of class that comes within the protection of 
section 1985(3) .214 In refusing to hold that section 1985(3) covers 
conspiracies motivated by invid iously discriminatory intent other 
than racial bias, the Court interpreted the statute not to include 
group actions resting on economic motivations such as union 
controversies. 2111 
210. Myers v. United Ststes, 272 U.S. 52, 70 (1926). See also Professor Alfred Avin's ststement, in oral argument before the United States Supreme Court in Katzenbach v. Mor· gan, 
.
384 U.S.641 (1966): "I w�ll say that I think it would be necessary for the Department of Ju.s�1ce to burn the ?ongress�onal Globe debates if they were to convince anybody that the ongmal. und�rstandmg was m accordance with this ststute." Record of Argument 49.50, quoted m Avms, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State Action and the Fourteenth Ame�d�e.nt, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 331, 381 n.249 (1967). 211 .  Hook, Ob1ectiv1ty and Reconstruction in History, in PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY 250, 255 (S. Hook ed. 1963). 
212. 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983). 
213. Id. at 3357. 
214. Id. at 3358-60. 
215. Id. at 3360. 
